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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of three essays in political economy. In the first
chapter, I study the short-run political polarization between Republican and Demo-
crat politicians in the House of Representatives before and after the November 2018
midterm election, using Twitter data. I compute various metrics of ideological polar-
ization at weekly intervals using methods such as hashtag analysis, topic modelling,
Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation, mention and retweet network analysis. I empirically
check for the patterns in political polarization during the election cycle at the level
of discourse. Different measures of polarization signal different patterns in polariza-
tion. When polarization is measured by hashtag divergence or topical divergence, it
seems to increase as the election approaches. However, when polarization is mea-
sured by divergence in word distribution, sentiment-augmented topic divergence, or
cited-media ideology divergence, it seems to decrease as the election approaches. This
pattern is consistent with a divergence in preferred electoral agenda but convergence
in agenda-item-specific positioning.
In the second chapter, I extend the framework of analysis that I developed to the
Indian context. I study the short run political polarization between the politicians of
the two main national political parties in India contesting in the Lok Sabha, the lower
house of the Indian parliament before and after the 2019 general elections, using data
ii
from their Twitter feed. I compute various measures of ideological polarization using
the methods described in the first chapter, and empirically test the policy convergence
hypothesis versus the policy divergence hypothesis discussed in the literature by anal-
ysis of these measures of ideological polarization. This chapter reiterates the findings
of the previous chapter, which shows that the different measures of polarization sig-
nal different patterns in polarization. We find increase in polarization as measured
through topical divergence and fall in polarization as measured through sentiment
augmented topic analysis suggesting divergence in agenda setting behavior and con-
vergence in agenda-item-specific positioning. This is similar to the pattern in the U.S
data. However, in contrast to the US data, polarization as measured through hash-
tag divergence decreases whereas polarization as measured by cited media ideology
increases as we approach the election in India.
In the third chapter chapter, my coauthor Sagnik Das from City University of New
York and myself study the effect of political business cycles on government expendi-
ture in India as measured using data from the world’s most extensive public works
programme (NREGA), new road constructed data as well as night light intensity data
which is used as a proxy for development. Using panel data at the district level span-
ning from 2011 to 2020 for NREGA employment and expenditure, 2000 to 2014 for
new road constructed under the PMGSY program and mean total calibrated night
light intensity from 1994 to 2014, we can show the existence of political business
cycles wherein politicians stimulate the economy before the election either to lure
myopic voters or to signal their capability to forward-looking voters. We find the
causal impact of political business cycle on expenditure undertaken under NREGA
and on employment provided under NREGA at the intensive margin. We also find
evidence of political business cycles impacting the length of new road constructed
iii
under PMGSY and money disbursed by the Government for new projects to be un-
dertaken under PMGSY. For night light intensity, we do find some evidence of the
causal impact of political business cycles. We also use high-frequency monthly night
light intensity data spanning from 1993-2013 to investigate the political business cy-
cle’s effect in the shorter run. We do see a statistically significant spike in night
light intensity one month before the election. However, we are unable to find any
conclusive trend with the approach of the election.
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Decline as Election Approaches:
Evidence from Twitter Data in
USA
1.1 Introduction
This paper presents novel high-frequency estimates of partisanship constructed
using Twitter data as applied to the US representatives. Political partisanship affects
not only preferences and voting behaviour but also other political and economic out-
comes. Survey results from Gerber and Huber (2009) show that beliefs about current
and expected future economic performance are more positive when the respondent’s
partisanship matches that of the current President. McConnell et al. (2018) show
that partisanship can also affect non - political markets such as the labour market
and the goods market. Using a sizeable experimental design, they show that workers
1
are willing to take a lower pay from co-partisans, suggesting a compensating differen-
tial. In the market for goods, the authors find that buyers are nearly twice as likely
to engage in a transaction when they and the seller share the same partisanship.
Although political partisanship has been shown to affect key outcomes, the theory
of political partisanship is mixed. Several papers have modelled a theory of short-
run political partisanship where parties are only motivated to win elections (Downs
(1957), Comanor (1976), Ledyard (1984) and others). In these models, where parties
are assumed to be only motivated to hold office, their proposed equilibrium policy
platforms converge before the elections. However, the policy convergence hypothesis
has been subjected to a lot of subsequent scrutiny, which has been critical of the
hypothesis and predicted policy divergence (Alesina (1988), Coughlin (1992), Besley
and Case (2003), Glaeser et al. (2005) and others).
On the other hand, research on long-run political polarization in the U.S. has shown
that polarization between parties has been on the rise since World War II. Although
there have been arguments about whether ideological scores are just moving to the
pre-WWII era or if there is real ideological polarization, there is some consensus
that polarization has been increasing for the last few decades. Figure 1.1 shows the
distance between the mean ideological score for the Democrat and Republican politi-
cians based on the first dimension of the DW-Nominate scores.1 The first dimension
computes the ideology of politicians along the liberal-conservative scale. The figure
shows that polarization in the House and the Senate has been increasing since the
1980s, and is at an all-time high in the past 125 years.
1The trend looks very similar when we use the Poole and Rosenthal estimate for the first dimen-
sion
2
There also has been some research on how partisanship has evolved in the medium
run by leveraging text data. Gentzkow et al. (2019) show that partisanship, as mea-
sured by Congressional speeches, is much more significant in the recent years than
the past, and has increased substantially since the 1990s, following the Contract with
America, Gingrich et al. (1994), remaining relatively flat before that. Several articles
have also shown that partisan differences have seeped into media language and of late
the two parties are using strategically different languages through consultants, focus
groups and polls. Lakoff (2003) suggests that this represents a substantial change in
how partisanship has evolved in recent years, especially with respect to linguistics.
Therefore, substantive empirical research shows rising rates of political polarization
between Democrats and Republicans in the long run and the medium run. However,
due to data paucity, there has not been substantial empirical research on short-run
political polarization, even though theoretical research abounds. A potential reason
for the dearth of empirical analysis of short-run political polarization is that no good
secondary source of data is available for measuring political ideology, except for the
DW-Nominate scores. These scores are constructed using roll-call data. However,
roll-call data is only available for each session of Congress, and therefore cannot be
used to understand ideological movements during the election cycle. Survey data
can help us look at polarization in a time series fashion at a high granularity level.
However, collecting survey data at such short intervals is very costly, especially for
elites such as Representatives or Senators. To circumvent this problem, I look at short-
run polarization between Democrat and Republican politicians using their Twitter
feeds. The Twitter data helps to zoom in on the politicians’ behaviour in the short
run, at a high granularity level.
3
To quantify the degree of polarization between Republican and Democrat politi-
cians, I compute several metrics to measure expressive ideological polarization using
Twitter data. I use the term ‘expressive ideology’ because I measure their ideological
estimates using Twitter’s rhetorical data and not their actual behaviour. To do this,
I collect tweets from incumbent politicians in the 116th House of Representatives, one
year before and after the midterm elections conducted on 6th November 2018 at a
weekly interval. I exploit both the tweets’ linguistic aspects and the network struc-
ture of the tweets to compute several metrics of polarization. For understanding the
linguistic aspect, I perform Hashtag Analysis, topic modelling using Latent Dirichlet
Allocation(LDA) and Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation to compute various estimates
of polarization. I also study the retweet and mention networks of politicians and
construct measures of polarization based on these networks.
A brief definition of each of these metrics is given here. Hashtag Similarity measures
the number of common hashtags used by Democrats and Republicans conditional on
the top hashtags used by them. Inverse of Sentiment Augmented Hashtag Distance
(Inverse Score std) is the inverse of the euclidean distance between vectors of frac-
tions of tweets corresponding to a particular hashtag with a negative sentiment by
Republicans and by Democrats. The lower the Inverse Score std, the lesser is the
polarization. Hellinger Distance and Kullback-Leibrar Divergence measure the dis-
tance between topic distributions (distributions of topics used by Democrats and
Republicans in their tweets) whereas the Jaccard Distance measures the distance be-
tween word distributions (distributions of words used by Democrats and Republicans
in their tweets). Next, each tweet is assigned to the most dominant topic contained
in the tweet. Dominant Topic Distance (Score) calculates the Euclidean distance
between two vectors of fractions devoted to each topic by Democrats and Republi-
4
cans. Sentiment Augmented Dominant Topic Distance (Sum Frac Dis) measures
the euclidean distance between the vectors of fractions of tweets that Republicans
and Democrats devote to positive, negative and neutral sentiment for each topic.
The greater the distance, the higher is the polarization for these distance-based mea-
sures. I also perform Bayesian Ideal point estimation based on the politicians’ URL
(Uniform Resource Locator) sharing behaviour to estimate the politicians’ ideologies.
For the mention and retweet network analysis, I calculate the share of how many
times a Democrat mentions/retweets a Republican negatively and vice versa. One
can find a detailed discussion on the construction of these metrics in Section 1.5.
Polarization, as measured by these metrics, varies considerably in the election cycle.
To get a sense of what happens close to the election, I zoom into eight weeks before
and after the election to look at what happens as we move into and away from the
election. The choice of 8 weeks is made because there are no primaries in this period,
and I hope to capture the upcoming midterm election effect. I report the broad trends
in these metrics here. Since there are only eight weeks of data, these metrics’ slope
estimates are not very precise, and most of them are not statistically significant. One
way to interpret these results strictly from the perspective of statistical significance
would be to say that there is no evidence of a decrease or increase in polarization
as we approach or move away from the election. This suggests that the theoretical
literature of policy convergence versus divergence does not play out in politicians’
Twitter feeds. However, since we only have one year of data, and if we are willing to
take a Bayesian approach, looking at the coefficients does suggest some patterns.
Polarization as measured by hashtag similarity and Inverse of Sentiment Augmented
Hashtag Distance (Inverse Score std) increases as we approach the election, falls
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once the election is over, and increases over the next eight weeks after the election.
The distance between topic distributions also increases as we approach the election,
falls once the election is over and keeps falling over the next eight weeks. Dominant
Topic Distance (Score) increases as we approach the election, falls after the election,
and keeps falling over the next eight weeks. On the other hand, Jaccard distance
which is the euclidean distance between word distributions falls as we approach the
election, falls after the election and increases as we move away from the election. Sen-
timent Augmented Dominant Topic Distance (Sum Frac Dis) falls as we approach
the election, increases once the election is over and falls again. The ideological differ-
ence, as measured by the difference between Bayesian Ideal Point Estimates falls as
we approach the election, falls once the election is over and then keeps increasing as
we move away from the election.
I find that there is an implicit and explicit element to polarization. As measured
by hashtag analysis, topic divergence and retweet and mention networks, polarization
increases as we approach the election suggesting that politicians get more polarized in
their agenda-setting behaviour. However, negative retweets of Democrats by Repub-
licans decrease in the last eight weeks in the approach to the election. On the other
hand, more implicit measures of polarization, as measured by divergence in words
used, sentiment augmented content analysis, and URL sharing behaviour decreases
as we approach the election. It makes sense to think that politicians are probably
trying to appeal to their electoral bases through their agenda-setting behaviour re-
garding the hashtags that they use and the topics they talk about. However, there is
a decrease in polarization in terms of the conversations within a topic. This suggests
that politicians are trying to appeal to the median voter through the content within a
topic. Therefore, we find that politicians can and do use different aspects of a tweet to
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talk to different sub populations and while they might seem to diverge in the agendas
that they talk about they might be converging within a particular agenda.
My contribution in this paper, therefore runs along three dimensions. First, I help
test the policy convergence versus policy divergence hypothesis, using a very rich data
set that allows me to compute ideological scores from various aspects of Twitter data.
This is the only paper to compute high-frequency ideological estimates of polarization
in a time-series fashion. Second, I add to the methodology of measuring political
polarization in the literature using the distance between two topic distributions and
sentiment augmented content analysis. Therefore, these methods can be replicated in
a less developed country fairly easily, which might not have official data like roll call
votes found in the U.S.2 Third, I also show that various dimensions of a tweet, such
as hashtags, content, networks which can all be used to convey information need to
be studied separately as they sometimes can provide competing signals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 talk the relevant theo-
retical background briefly. Section 1.3 discusses other relevant literature. Section 1.4
discusses the data. Section 1.5 discusses the methodology of computation of the vari-
ous measures. Section 1.6 talks about the empirical methodology and the results and
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Background
There have been broadly two approaches to modelling short-run political par-
tisanship. The first way short-run political partisanship has been modelled assumes
2Although the algorithms are scalable, they are costly in terms of computational and manual
resources.
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that political parties are only interested in holding office or winning the election. The
most seminal result from this assumption, as shown by Downs (1957) assuming ra-
tional voters and using Hotelling (1990) model of spatial competition is that parties
converge on the policy preferred by the median voter. Comanor (1976) has shown
that the median voter theorem holds under reasonable degrees of skewness of polit-
ical preferences. Other works such as Ledyard (1984), Coughlin and Nitzan (1981),
Hinich (1976) also predict policy convergence of other types, though not always to
the preference of the median voter, in the case of office motivated political parties.
Other papers consider that politicians or parties which are sometimes considered
synonymous are ideologically motivated. Wittman (1983), Calvert (1985) consider
ideologically motivated politicians, but predict that equilibrium policies chosen by
the parties are very close to each other because they assume that parties have a
binding commitment to their policy platform and assume certainty about voters’
preferences.
There have been several ways that scholars have challenged the policy convergence
hypothesis. Alesina (1988) in his seminal paper shows that in the absence of a binding
commitment device, which is mostly absent in elections, in a one-shot electoral game,
political parties have no incentive to stick to their announced policy level, after the
election is over. Rational voters can correctly anticipate the politicians’ behaviour,
and therefore expect to have policy divergence, which then becomes the equilibrium
strategy for the political parties. If the parties have a reasonably high discount factor,
then in an infinitely repeated game, they might sustain a convergent policy position.
However, if one party believes that the other party’s leadership may change, leading
to a low discount factor, the co-operative equilibrium breaks. The parties revert to
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the outcome of the one-shot electoral game predicting policy divergence. Some papers
assume uncertainty about voters’ preferences by the candidates Coughlin (1992) and
Ordeshook (1986) making them unsure of how voters will choose and thereby predict-
ing platform divergence. Other models of this flavour assume uncertainty about the
degree to which candidates will implement campaign promises, non-policy consider-
ations like candidates’ personal qualities, imperfect mapping of candidates’ positions
due to incomplete information, weighing of decisions by candidate ”competence,” am-
bivalence towards candidates’ positions, or other unpredictable factors such as voter
mistakes Erikson and Romero (1990), Bartels (1986), Alvarez and Brehm (1995).
Apart from the commitment problem and problem of uncertainty of preferences,
Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997) develop citizen candidate
models, where citizens who are ideologically motivated contest in an election and
implement their preferred policy on winning. These models also predict policy di-
vergence. Several papers also use the probabilistic voting model where elites are
uncertain about voter’s preferences. Glaeser et al. (2005) in their paper talk about
another reason for policy divergence. They argue that if promoting extreme party
positions, helps in the sorting of voters such that it increases donations and voter
turnout, thereby increasing the probability of winning, parties will prefer to diverge
their policies.
Therefore, my aim in this paper is to look at the polarization between politicians
in the context of social media over a shorter time period and at a high frequency.
According to the median voter theorem, politicians should converge in expressed ide-
ology/proposed policy as an election approaches. Since traditional data on politicians
ideology is measured by DW-Nominate Score, which is based on Congressional voting
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records, it is not possible to see the movement of ideological scores over short inter-
vals of time, due to data constraints. To solve this problem, and to understand elite
polarization in the context of social media, I use Twitter data from the incumbent
Congressional members of the 116th House of Congress and compute metrics of their
ideology using Twitter data from one year before and after the election and see if
their expressed ideologies converge as the election on November 6, 2018 approaches.
1.3 Other Relevant Literature
Juxtaposed with the theoretical and empirical modelling of short-run political par-
tisanship, another literature has documented the growing long-run polarization be-
tween Republicans and Democrats. Aldrich (1995), McCarty et al. (1997), Jacobson
(2000), Hetherington (2001), Collie and Mason (2000) have all shown the growing po-
litical polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the U.S in the government.
Layman et al. (2010) show that Republicans and Democrats have become polarized
both in the government and in the electorate through conflict extension along several
dimensions.
In the backdrop of increasing long-run political polarization, I compute high-
frequency estimates of political polarization in the short-run. Twitter data is an
excellent source of data to identify this kind of variation in ideology for several rea-
sons. Twitter data helps us gain insight into the political discourse at very short
intervals, almost week by week. A possible flip side is that Twitter data, unlike roll
call data, does not give us any access to behavioural insights regarding actual votes
in favour or against a particular policy. However, the fact that politicians have in-
creasingly taken to Twitter to state their policy positions, lends legitimacy to analyze
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their Twitter feeds. For example, the former President Donald Trump sent out 518
tweets (11 deleted) in the first 100 days of his Presidency according to politico.com,
meaning that he alone sent out five tweets on average per day. This is not a trait spe-
cific to the former President. Most politicians have tried to make use of the “Obama
Model” to reach the general public, Towner and Dulio (2012). The way that social
media has been used for political campaigning has been documented in a number of
research studies (Adams and McCorkindale (2013), Conway et al. (2013), Golbeck
et al. (2010), Graham et al. (2013), Grant et al. (2010), Johnson and Perlmutter
(2010), Xiong et al. (2019)). These studies testify that ever since Twitter came into
effect in 2006, it has been increasingly adopted by politicians worldwide to influence
their campaign strategy. Social media and traditional media are also found to have a
symbiotic relationship in terms of agenda-setting during election campaigns as found
in a paper by Conway et al. (2015). They investigated the relationship between the
Twitter feeds of political candidates and parties and the news media output.
Although social media has been considered an essential element of political cam-
paigning, social networking sites (SNSs) such as Twitter are considered the favoured
forms of social media for campaign purposes. SNSs are unique because they allow
connections to be displayed openly. However, unlike some SNSs which have privacy
controls, Twitter users have mainly public profiles, which do not require bidirectional
confirmation of networks (Boyd and Ellison (2007), Vergeer (2015)). This allows it
to be used as a broadcast medium, an extensively used attribute in political cam-





The United States of America had a midterm election on 6th November 2018
where 435 seats from the US House of Representatives were contested. I collected the
official Twitter handle of all the incumbents from the US House of Representatives
who also won in the 2018 elections. This was done by searching for verified handles
for each of the incumbent members. In the presence of more than one verified handle,
I considered the one which had the link to the Representative’s official page in the
official website of the US House of Representatives.3 I collected tweets at weekly
intervals for each politician tweeted by them from 7th November, 2017 to 5th Novem-
ber, 2019, a total of 104 weeks or two years of data using an application called Social
Studio.4 For some of the weeks where data was not available through Social Studio,
I used the Twitter API.
In my data set, I have access to the name of Congressperson who tweeted, the
tweet’s content, the publish date and time of the tweet and whether the tweet was a
normal tweet, retweet or quote tweet.
There are 177 Democrats, and 165 Republicans in my data set5. Only one Democrat
incumbent winner and two Republican incumbent winners did not have an official
handle. The number of politicians in my data set account for 78.62 % of the total
3This was true for famous politicians, whose campaign accounts or personal accounts were also
verified.
4I am thankful to the Social Media Listening Center, Clemson University for providing me access
to the Social Studio app.
5The twitter handles were collected in October 2019, and the Congresspeople who had verified
twitter handles then, are included in the data-set.
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number of politicians in the U.S House of Representatives.6 Figure 1.2 shows the
number of active incumbent politicians over time, with the number being calculated
every week. A politician is defined as an active politician even if s/he makes atleast
one tweet in the span of the week, under consideration, s/he is counted into the
number of active politicians. So, if politician X tweets one message in the 22nd week,
but not in the 23rd week he/she would be counted as an active politician in the 22nd
week but not in the 23rd week. We have an average number of 146 active Republicans
and 168 active Democrats in our data set every week. The higher number of average
active Democrats compared to Republicans is attributed to two reasons. First, there
are higher number of Democrats in my data set, but second whereas approximately
94.91 % of the total Democrats are active authors, 88.48 % of Republicans are active
authors.
Figure 1.3 shows the total tweets by Democrats and Republicans over time, com-
puted every week. This figure shows that based on absolute numbers, Democrats
tweet more than Republicans. Republicans post around 1852 tweets every week,
whereas Democrats post 3350 tweets every week. To see if this variation comes only
from the higher number of Democrats in my sample or if Democrats demonstrate
a higher tweeting propensity than Republicans, we refer to Figure 1.4. Figure 1.4
shows the average number of tweets by each active incumbent member of the House
over time, computed every week. This figure shows that even after controlling for
the number of active authors, Democrats tweet more on average than Republicans.
Whereas a Republican posts 13 tweets on average per week, a Democrat posts 20
tweets on average per week.
6I only consider incumbents who contested in 2018 and won, so that I can get their tweets from
the official handles after the election too. However, there were only three incumbents who contested
in the 2018 election and did not win, and hence I argue that since the number is so small, it should
not introduce a huge selection bias in my data
13
Figures 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 also show some broad trends. For example, for all the graphs,
we see a dip in the numbers during the last week of December and the beginning of
New Years, when politicians are probably spending time with their families. Another
unique thing about the figures is that Democrats and Republicans’ tweets’ trend
appears to follow the same pattern in the crests and troughs. Whether this is due
to some underlying causal factor or a feedback mechanism between Democrats and
Republicans is unclear.
1.4.2 Competitiveness of Race Data
Along with the Twitter data, I also collect the competitiveness of race informa-
tion for all the congressional districts of the United States for the 104 weeks that are
there in my data-set. I collect this data from the Cook Political Report by scraping
the website for the data. The data provides information on whether a district is Solid
Republican, Solid Democrat, Likely Republican, Likely Democrat, Lean Republican,
Lean Democrat, Republican Toss-Up or Democrat Toss-Up. As the name suggests,
solid refers to the safest districts, followed by Likely and Lean, whereas Toss-up refers
to the most competitive districts. There are 64 weeks of unique data. I match up
the competitiveness of race data with the 104 weeks of data in my original sample,
by assigning the value of race competitiveness of a particular district in a particular
week to the closest race competitiveness data available at that time.7 This allows
for time-sensitive data on race-competitiveness. Auter and Fine (2016) use this mea-
sure of the competitiveness of an election in their paper on negative campaigning on
Facebook. They find that underdog candidates in less-competitive races indulge in
7There are 64 weeks of race competitiveness data in my data-set. There is no competitiveness
data between 5th November 2018 and 12th April 2019. I assign the race competitiveness data
of either 5th November 2018 or 12th April 2019 to the weeks for which I do not have any race
competitiveness data depending upon which date is closer to the particular week in question.
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negative campaigning in issue attacks, whereas candidates in competitive races are
more into a personal attack. There is, therefore, a reason to believe that the com-
petitiveness of race in a district will also influence the ideology of Democrats and
Republicans in that district.
1.5 Computation of Ideological Estimates
To understand whether politicians behave differently at least in the domain of
rhetoric in the advent of an election, I analyze the tweet’s content from a linguistic
perspective, along with the network structure of the tweeting behaviour of the politi-
cians. With the increase in computational power and the explosion in unstructured
data, text-data analysis is continually being used to answer various questions and
is being considered an increasingly important data source, Gentzkow et al. (2019).
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) use text data to develop an index of media slant to as-
sess the similarity of the language used by a news outlet to that used by a Republican
or Democrat. Social scientists have also analyzed text data for understanding polar-
ization specifically. Gentzkow et al. (2019) study the partisanship trend in Congress
by analyzing speech from 1873 to 2009. Ash et al. (2017) similarly look at U.S Cir-
cuit court judges’ polarization using text data of the court opinions from the 1890s
to 2010s. Bara et al. (2007) analyses parliamentary debates in the U.K to identify
the dominant themes in debate and also the difference in discourse between leaders
favouring different policy positions.
Some other studies have specifically used Twitter to understand polarization. Dem-
szky et al. (2019) use the natural language processing framework to understand po-
litical polarization in Twitter, in the context of 21 mass shootings in the USA. Monti
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et al. (2013) model political disaffection using Italian Twitter data by employing
sentiment analysis.
Although the use of text data is increasing over time, the field itself is in its early
stages and is still evolving. There are several different methods available that scholars
have used in the past. In this paper to analyze the linguistic aspect of the tweets,
I perform Hashtag analysis, topic modelling, sentiment analysis, and Bayesian Ideal
Point estimation to create metrics of ideological polarization. In assessing the network
structure of the politicians’ tweeting behaviour, I study the retweet network and the
mention network complemented with sentiment analysis of the tweets.
1.5.1 Hashtag Analysis
To start with the computation of metrics of polarization, I look at the similarity
in hashtags used. Hashtag similarity is defined as the number of common hashtags
used by Democrats and Republicans conditional on the top hashtags used by them.
To compute the hashtag similarity, I proceed in the following way: First, I extract
the top 40 hashtags used by Republicans in a week. Let us denote this set of hashtags
by R40. Second I extract the top 40 hashtags used by Democrats in a week.
8 Let us
denote this set of hashtags by D40. I then compute the number of similar hashtags
between the sets R40 and D40. Let us denote this by Hashtag40. In other words,
Hashtag40 = n(R40 ∩D40), (1.1)
where n(.) denotes the cardinal number. I also compute Hashtag10, Hashtag20,
Hashtag50, Hashtag100 for robustness checks. These values show how the usage of
8I convert all the hashtags to lower case because sometimes the same hashtags can be written in
different cases.
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common hashtags used by Republicans and Democrats vary conditional on the top
hashtags used by each group. Table 1.1 for example shows the top 20 hashtags one
week before and after the election. The italicized and underlined words show the
common hashtags used both by Republicans and Democrats. In the week before the
election there is only one common hashtag whereas in the week after the election,
there are four common hashtags.
Hashtags in Twitter are used as an organic and community-driven method to add
context to the data, Wang et al. (2011). They can, therefore, be thought of as broad
topics that the Twitter users are talking about. Some studies have also shown that
hashtags are sometimes used as framing devices, Moscato (2016) in guiding the polit-
ical conversation. Bruns and Burgess (2015) talks about how hashtags have evolved
from ad hoc devices in Twitter to tools that can be used to organize movements
and guide the discussion of topics in the platform. The role of hashtags in guiding
social and political movements have been studied in many situations such as Cana-
dian elections, Arab Springs movement, student protest movement against high fees
in Africa, and the recent feminist movement which is best known by the hashtag it
used, #MeToo (Langa et al. (2017), Small (2011), Moscato (2016), Huang (2011),
Bruns et al. (2014)). Therefore, I start by looking at the similarity of hashtags used
by Republican and Democrat politicians over time as they give us the first piece of
evidence of the way conversation changes between these two groups as the election
approaches and if it changes once the election is over.
Figure 1.5 shows the trends of these metrics over the election cycle. According to
this figure, the overlap between hashtags keeps decreasing as the election approaches,
and increases after the election. This suggests that Democrats and Republicans talk
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about different agendas in the approach to the election. The same pattern is valid
for all four trends. I also do the hashtag analysis for tweets which have a negative
sentiment and a positive sentiment and get similar results. This means that irrespec-
tive of the tweet’s sentiment, the number of common hashtags used by Republicans
and Democrats fall as they approach the election. The figures are presented in the
Appendix.
1.5.1.1 Sentiment augmented Euclidean Distance between hashtags
Hashtags are generally very context-specific and are used to convey only a par-
ticular sentiment, as shown by the hashtags in Table 1.1. While Democrats use #get-
covered, #protectourcare and #goptaxscam, Republicans use #taxreform, #taxcut-
sandjobsact and #maga. However, there can be times when a particular common
hashtag is used positively by representatives from one party but negatively by repre-
sentatives from the other party. In that case, an increase in the number of common
hashtags might give us a false sense of decreasing rhetorical polarization between the
two parties. To tackle this problem, I perform a sentiment analysis of the tweets
containing hashtags. I use the Vader Sentiment analysis module in Python, which
is a valence based sentiment analysis module developed especially for micro-blogging
sites such as Twitter, Hutto and Gilbert (2014).9 The package computes the positive,
negative and neutral polarity for each tweet. It also gives a compound score. If the
compound score is less than -0.5, the tweet is considered negative, if it is greater than
+0.5, the tweet is considered positive, and if the scores lies between -0.5 and + 0.5,
the tweet is considered to be neutral.
9They use a gold standard of lexical features as well as the polarity and intensity of words to
compute the sentiment score. They also show that their approach is better than eleven of the
common and most widely used Sentiment Analysis methods and outperforms human accuracy.
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To combine the hashtag analysis with the sentiment analysis, I compute the distance
between the fraction of negative tweets for the Republicans and Democrats out of all
the tweets that use a similar hashtag. For example, a common hashtag in the top 40
hashtags used by Democrats and Republicans for the week of 1st August to 7th August
2018 is #smallbusinessweek. I count the fraction of tweets made using a negative
sentiment using the hashtag #smallbusinessweek by Democrats and Republicans. I
repeat this for all the common hashtags in Hashtag40 and calculate the Euclidean
distance between those two vectors.
In other words, assume that there are s common topics in the top 40 hashtags used
by Republicans and Democrats. Therefore, the length of Hashtag40 which we have
already defined is s. I now construct two vectors D40s and R40s . Let the first element




Tweets by Democrats which contain the first hashtag




Tweets by Democrats which contain the first hashtag




where n denotes the cardinal number. I similarly compute all the elements for
D40s , R40s and find the euclidean distance between these two vectors. This is denoted
by Score40, where Score40 is defined as follows:





After this, I standardize the scores by the number of common hashtags by dividing
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Score by the square root of the number of common hashtags. For example, Score40std





I similarly also compute Score10std , Score20std , Score50std and Score100std . I focus only
on negative sentiments because hashtags, being context-specific, have either a positive
or a negative undertone. Hence, it does not make much sense to distinguish between
tweets with a positive sentiment and a neutral sentiment in case of hashtags. There-
fore, treating positive and neutral tweets as a single non-negative category essentially
means that we only need to calculate the negative category’s Euclidean Distance. A
high Euclidean Distance in the negative category automatically implies that distance
in the non-negative category is also high and vice-versa.
Another point to note is that in doing the actual analysis, I use the inverse of
Score10 and Score10std which I refer to as Inv Score 10 and Inv Score 10 std. This
is done because if there are no common hashtags for any of the groups, then the
distance would be calculated as 0, but that does not make sense. A distance close
to 0 implies no polarization, whereas 0 common hashtags do not imply the same. To
resolve this ambiguity, we take the inverse of the score, such that a high score means
less polarization and low score means high polarization. When there are no common
hashtags, the metric is set to a value of 0, as no common hashtags imply the most
significant degree of polarization.
Fig 1.6 shows the trend of the inverse of the standardized scores. The non-
standardized scores look the same and are included in the Appendix. This graph
shows that as we approach the election, the inverse of the euclidean distance falls, or
in other words, the euclidean distance increases. This means that conditional on using
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the same hashtags in the top hashtags that Democrats and Republicans use; they use
it with different sentiments as they approach the election implying that polarization
in using hashtags increases as the election gets closer. The trend after the election is
different for top 10 and 20 hashtags versus the others. This might be because some
hashtags in the top 10 or 20 hashtags have very different characteristics compared to
the hashtags in top 40, 50 or 100. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the euclidean
distance has a clear pattern before the election, and it increases as we approach the
election.
1.5.2 Topic Modelling
After looking at the hashtags, which are broad level agenda setting items,
I look at the tweets’ content directly. This allows us to understand the data even
better. To do this, I use the method of topic modelling. Topic modeling is an
unsupervised machine learning algorithm that scans through a set of documents,
detects word and phrase patterns within them, and automatically clusters words and
phrases within those documents. These documents can be news articles, congressional
speeches, parliamentary debates or in my case tweets. Topic Modelling helps us go
one step further in looking at the divergence between Republicans and Democrats by
looking at the tweets’ content. A number of very prominent and influential studies
have been conducted in the field of information retrieval and automatic detection of
topics in political speeches (Steyvers et al. (2004), Mamou et al. (2007), Quinn et al.
(2010)). Boyd-Graber et al. (2017) shows the recent topic modelling applications for
information retrieval, linguistic understanding, statistical inference and other tasks.
Topic modelling has also been used in the domain of social media data. Lucas et al.
(2015) analyses how to perform topic modelling for tweets in different languages.
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For applying topic modelling to my case, I use the tweets’ content sent out by the
politicians.
I apply the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model to my corpora of tweets to
perform topic modelling.10 One of the parameters that need to be provided to the
LDA model is the number of topics in the corpora. There is no perfect objective
measure to estimate the optimal number of topics for a given corpus, in the literature
yet. One of the ways to estimate the right number of topics, is to look at the coherence
score, for the different number of topics, and select the number of topics, when the
coherence score stops increasing.11
The LDA algorithm, first developed by Blei et al. (2003), has revolutionized infor-
mation retrieval. LDA is an unsupervised, probabilistic machine learning algorithm
that automatically groups words based on which words occur together more frequently
in a corpus of data. Barberá et al. (2018) uses LDA model on tweets by the 113th
Congress members, select media outlets, and other groups of people, such as general
public, attentive, close party supporters, media and show using a Vector Auto Re-
gression model that politicians are most attentive to issues of close party supporters
10To apply the LDA model the data needs to be pre-processed in order to be ready for the
application of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA). In keeping with the norms of Natural Language
Processing (NLP), and the specificity of Twitter data, I remove the special characters such as ’@’,
’#’ specific to Twitter, and punctuation like the period, comma, semicolon and others. I also remove
all the stopwords, words such as ‘the’, ‘in’, ‘from’, etcetera, which are very common in the English
language, but devoid of any meaning.I use the NLTK corpus of stopwords for the English for this step
of pre-processing. I then lemmatize the data, which means that all words in our data-set, (referred
to as tokens in the NLP nomenclature), are converted to their base form. For example, am/is/are
are all converted to be. I also stemmed the data, which is another form of converting the words
to their base form. However, in the context of Twitter data, lemmatization seems to be better at
tokenization than stemming. I also create bigrams and trigrams to capture words that might always
be associated together. For example, the term ’White House’ is an excellent example of a bigram,
that could be present in our data-set. We would lose the significance of the term ”White House”, if
we used only the unigram model, which would treat ‘white’ and ‘house’ as two separate words.
11Since, the LDA is a probabilistic model each run of the model, generates new values of the
coherence score. I set a random seed equal to zero so that the model can be replicated.
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for setting the agenda. Nardi Jr (2012) uses the LDA model to analyze Supreme
Court Decisions’ text in the Philippines Supreme Court. Jacobi et al. (2016) uses the
LDA model to study large volumes of journalistic text from The New York Times
from 1945 to the present. Sokolova et al. (2016) identified election related events
using LDA. Ryoo and Bendle (2017) use the LDA model to study the social media
strategies of the two campaigns in the 2016 U.S election. The model can be used to
infer what percentage of each topic is present in a particular tweet. This helps us
understand which topic a particular tweet is about. Figures 1.7 and 1.8 show the
first topic in a LDA model fitted over Republican and Democrat politicians’ tweets
separately with ten topics, in the month of November to December 2017. The figure
shows that the first topic mostly deals with taxation and economy, whereas we see
words such as taxreform, economy, and american in the tweets by Republicans, and
words such as goptaxscam and middleclass by the Democrats.12
To implement the LDA model for my data, I first run the model on each week
of tweets for both Republicans and Democrats combined.13 I run the LDA model
for single-digit topic numbers because using more than those number means that
my topics are going to have a sparse number of tokens/words, and more than nine
topics seem too many for one week. I calculate each of these models’ coherence
score and choose the optimal number of topics based on the coherence score. The
model is then re-run with the optimal number of topics for the Republican tweets and
Democrat tweets separately. This provides us with two topic distributions, one for the
Democrats and one for the Republicans. After running the optimal LDA model for
Republican and Democrat tweets separately, I assign each tweet by the Republicans
12This is only for purposes of illustration and the actual models are trained on weekly data, after
picking the optimal number of topics using coherence score.
13I use the mallet wrapper to run the LDA model because it is considered to be a faster imple-
mentation of the LDA model, than the traditional gensim library.
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and Democrats to one of the topics for that week. For example, say if a particular
week had four optimal topics based on the coherence score, all tweets in that week
are assigned to one of the four topics. I use the topic with the highest percentage in
a tweet, to assign that topic to that particular tweet. After doing this, I analyze the
content in the tweets by the following two methods.
1.5.2.1 Computation of Distance Metrics
I compute similarity and dissimilarity measures between the two topic prob-
ability distributions obtained after running the trained LDA model (trained on the
pooled tweets of Republicans and Democrats) separately on Democrat and Repub-
lican tweets. There are three measures in the literature which seem to serve our
purpose. The Hellinger distance is the analogue of measuring the Euclidean Distance
between two probability distributions and is a symmetric distance measure.14
The Kullback–Leibler divergence also known as relative entropy also measures the
distance between two probability distributions, but is not symmetric like the Hellinger
distance.15
The Jaccard index, also known as the Intersection over Union or the Jaccard sim-
ilarity coefficient is a measure of the overlap between two sets. The Jaccard index
measures the similarity between finite sample sets and is defined as the size of the




















where p(x) and q(x) are the density functions for P and Q respectively.
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intersection divided by the size of the sample sets’ union. The Jaccard distance is
the complement to the Jaccard index. It measures the dissimilarity between two sets
and is obtained by subtracting the Jaccard index from 1.16 I use it to measure the
distance between the word distributions used by Republicans and Democrats.
The distances are computed from November 7, 2017, to November 5, 2019, at weekly
intervals for 104 weeks. Fig 1.9 shows the pattern of these metrics over the election
cycle. The patterns in the distance between the topic distributions measured by the
Hellinger distance and Kullback Leibler Divergence are very similar. Hellinger denotes
the Hellinger distance whereas the Kullback Leibler divergence is denoted as KLD in
the figure. Since the KLD is not symmetric, I calculate the KLD from Democrats
to Republicans denoted as KLD DR and vice versa. The divergence between topic
distributions as measured by all these three measures increases as we approach the
election. This means that as the election approaches, Republicans and Democrats
talk about different topics. The Jaccard distance is calculated between the raw text
(after pre-processing the data) used by Democrats and Republicans. I use the vector
of all words together used by Democrats and Republicans, and the Jaccard distance,
in this case, is denoted by JD DR. I also use vectors containing a list of words, each
list being one tweet and the Jaccard distance, in this case, is denoted by JD DLRL.
According to Fig 1.9 the distance between the word distributions fall as we approach
the election or Republicans and Democrats use similar words as we approach the
election but not to a very high degree.
16The Jaccard distance is defined as follows:




where A and B are finite samples.
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1.5.2.2 Euclidean Distance for the dominant topic
The LDA model assigns each tweet to multiple topics. For the next part of
the analysis, I find the dominant topic for each tweet and assign it to that particular
topic. I calculate the Euclidean Distance between the vectors of the fraction of tweets
devoted to each topic by the Democrats and Republicans each week. For example, if
there are s topics in a particular week, I obtain two vectors Ds and Rs for that week.
Both these vectors have s elements. Let the first element of Ds vector be denoted by
Ds(1). Then,
Ds(1) =
n(Tweets by Democrats which belong to topic 1)
n(Total tweets by Democrats)
, (1.8)
where n denotes the cardinal number. I similarly compute all the elements of Ds and
Rs, and find the Euclidean Distance between these two vectors. This is denoted by
Score.
Score = d(Ds, Rs) =
√
(Ds(1)−Rs(1))2 + (Ds(2)−Rs(2))2 + ...
+ (Ds(s)−Rs(s))2
(1.9)
Score helps in understanding the between topic variability in the dominant topics
used by Democrats and Republicans. A low value of Score implies that both the
parties devote similar weights to the various dominant topics they use in their tweets,
whereas a higher value of Score implies that they talk about different topics. Fig
1.10 shows the pattern that the Score metric follows over the election cycle. As the
election approaches, there is a rise in the value of the score, which again suggests that
Democrats and Republicans are talking about different topics in the approach to the
election.
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One might wonder if the between topic variability is increasing just due to the
number of topics increasing in the approach to the election. However, Fig 1.11 shows
that the number of topics in a week decrease in the approach to the election. There-
fore, despite the absolute number of topics decreasing, the between topic variability
increases corroborating the fact that Democrats and Republicans do devote their
tweets to different topics as the election approaches.
1.5.2.3 Euclidean Distance Interacted with Sentiments
The Euclidean Distance helps us understand the pattern in the usage of topics
by Republicans and Democrats but provide no insight into how these topics are
being used. To make more sense of the intent of the content used for each topic,
I perform sentiment augmented content analysis and compute two types of metrics
where sentiment is interacted with the topic. These measures give us a low value if
Democrats and Republicans talk about the same topic with similar sentiments, and
gives us a high value if they talk about the same topic using different sentiments. The
two approaches that I take are as follows.
For the first type of metric, I compute the fraction of positive, negative and neutral
shares for each topic for Democrats and Republicans separately, then compute the
euclidean distance for each topic between Republicans and Democrats, and add the
distances for all the topics. For example, if there are s topics in a particular week,
I compute 6 vectors PositiveDs , NegativeDs , NeutralDs , PositiveRs , NegativeRs ,
NeutralRs with s elements each. The first element for PositiveDs , denoted by
27




Tweets by Democrats which belong to topic 1
and have a positive sentiment
)
n(Total tweets by Democrats which belong to topic 1)
, (1.10)
where n denotes the cardinal number. I similarly compute all the other vectors. My
first measure Sum Frac Dis, is defined as follows,
Sum Frac Dis =
d(PositiveDs , PositiveRs) + d(NegativeDs , NegativeRS)
+ d(NeutralDs , NeutralRs)
,
(1.11)
where d(., .) denotes the Euclidean distance between two vectors.
Second, instead of computing the fractions of positive tweets for a particular topic
for each group, I use the intensity of the sentiment to derive the metric for Euclidean
distance. Therefore, instead of counting the number of positive, negative or neutral
tweets for each group, I compute the intensity of positivity, negativity and neutrality
in the tweets. For s topics, I again compute the six vectors PositiveDs , NegativeDs ,
NeutralDs , PositiveRs , NegativeRs , NeutralRs . The first element for PositiveDs ,
denoted by PositiveDs(1) is defined as follows,
PositiveDs(1) =
Mean value of positive score for tweets by Democrats
which had a positive sentiment and belonged to topic 1
(1.12)
The metric Sum Dis is then calculated as follows,
Sum Dis =
d(PositiveDs , PositiveRs) + d(NegativeDs , NegativeRs)
+ d(NeutralDs , NeutralRs)
, (1.13)
where d(., .) denotes the Euclidean distance between two vectors.
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Figure 1.12 shows the pattern of Euclidean Distance interacted with the sentiment
for the fraction of positive, negative and neutral tweets of a particular topic. Unlike
the Score metric discussed in the last subsection, the value of the Sum Frac Dis
falls as we approach the election. This suggests that Democrats and Republicans use
similar sentiment to talk about common topics as they approach the election. We
get the same trends when we use the intensity of the positive, negative or neutral
sentiment instead of the fractions. The figure is shown in the Appendix.
1.5.3 Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation
The third way I try to capture the short-run polarization is by computation
of the politicians’ ideological estimates using their tweets by the method of Bayesian
ideal point estimation. This method developed by Eady (2018) uses the URL sharing
behaviour to infer the politicians’ ideology.17 The idea is that politicians will share
more URLs from a media source close to them in the ideological spectrum. A Monte
Carlo simulation is then performed to infer the ideologies of the politicians.
To estimate the ideologies of the politicians, I extract the URLs from the tweets of
the Representatives. The extracted URLs are shortened URLs, and cannot be directly
used. The URLs are then expanded into their long-form by querying the server
using the shortened URLs. I then extract the URLs’ domain names and compute an
adjacency matrix of how many times each Congressperson has tweeted any particular
website. Retweets are included in this analysis, as retweets also signify the reiteration
of the original tweet’s content by the person who is retweeting the original tweet. I
remove all social media domain names from the adjacency matrix such as google.com,
17They talk about the analysis in ‘Trying to understand how Jeff Flake is leaning? We analyzed
his Twitter feed — and were surprised” in The Washington Post, October 5,2018.
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facebook.com, instagram.com and others as these do not have any ideological content
of their own.18 For data sanity purposes, I take only 90 percent of the total shares
of news domains, as this helps the data to be devoid of obscure websites, which
had only been mentioned once or twice, and other obscure names, which show up in
the adjacency matrix due to technicalities of domain name extraction. After this, I
employ the empirical strategy used by Eady (2018)19. I differ from Eady’s strategy
in that I do not specify whether an individual is a Republican and Democrat, and
only use the information from the URL sharing behaviour to get my estimates.
The empirical strategy is implemented as follows:
yim ∼ NegBin(αim, ψiψm) (1.14)
αim = exp(θi + λm − ||τi − υm||2), (1.15)
where yim denotes the count of shares of domain m shared by user i, in our case a
member of the House of Representatives; θi denotes a user-specific intercept which
essentially means that some Congresspeople are more active on Twitter and may
indulge in higher URL sharing activity; λm denotes a domain-specific intercept which
similarly accounts for the fact that some domains might have a higher probability
of being shared than others, and ψi and ψm denote user-specific and domain-specific
dispersion parameters respectively to capture the predictability in the model. The
quantities of interest are denoted by τi, which represents the ideology of user i, and
18I also remove any website that has ”house.gov” in its URL, because the Representatives seem
to be using Twitter as a platform to broadcast those websites.
19He has developed a mediascores package in R available on Github for faster and more straight-
forward implementation of the Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation, which I have used for my analysis.
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υm, the ideology of m, the website being shared. As the term −||τi − υm||2 makes
clear, the larger the ideological spatial distance between the ideology τi of the user
and the ideology υm of the website, the less likely the user is to share stories from
that website. Priors are placed on the model parameters as follows:
θi ∼ Normal(µθ, σθ) (1.16)
λm ∼ Normal(0, σλ), (1.17)
where uniform prior distributions are placed on the hyper-parameters µθ, σθ and









b ), with uniform priors on the
hyper-parameters. For identification, the parameters representing news media ideol-
ogy are centered on 0: υm ∼ Normal(0, συ). Lastly, the model’s direction needs to be
set, such that high values represent ideological liberalism or conservatism. The re-
searcher fixes the anchors (e.g. nytimes.com, foxnews.com), such that the ideology of
the first media organization defines the low end of the scale (in this example, liberal),
and the second, the high end (in this example, conservative).
In my case, I choose the anchors to be domains shared by one of the parties more
relative to the other party. Using this methodology, I compute the number of times a
Democrat has shared a particular domain divided by the number of times it has been
tweeted totally, to be the most Democratic domain and similarly for Republicans. I
call this the most differential domain for Democrats and Republicans respectively. I
also eliminate the domains shared by less than 2 percent of the respective group of
politicians. They would be fringe websites, and will not be efficient for the Monte
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Carlo Simulation. One of the upshots of this analysis is that I choose the anchor
websites dynamically and objectively based on the politicians’ tweeting behaviour
and not subjectively as has been done in the original implementation of the model.
The most differential domain by Democrats moves between vox.com, nytimes.com,
cnn.com, npr.org and others. The most differential domain by the Republicans lingers
between foxnews.com, wsj.com, www.washingtonexaminer and others. I had also
replicated the analysis with the most highly tweeted domain, and in that case, the
Democrat anchor website is overwhelmingly nytimes.com. Since nytimes.com is not
considered to be the most extreme left leaning news media organization, I think
fixing the anchor website to be the most differentially highly tweeted domain makes
more sense. Fig 1.13 and Fig 1.14 shows the most popular domain names among
the Democrat and Republican politicians respectively. Another point of departure
from the traditional model as implemented is that I do not assign separate groups
to Democrats and Republicans as I want only the URL sharing behaviour to inform
their ideological points, and not to get biased by their group identity, as already
explained before. Therefore, the estimates in my model are not biased by ex-ante
group identity.
I also divide the politicians depending upon whether they are contesting in a com-
petitive or non-competitive race. As mentioned in Section 1.4, solid districts are
considered as non-competitive districts, whereas Likely, Lean or Toss-up districts are
considered as competitive districts. Each week the politician contesting from a par-
ticular district is considered to be competitive if that particular district is competitive
in that week and to be non-competitive if the particular district is non-competitive
that week Figure 1.15 shows the mean ideological trend for the Democrats and the
Republicans calculated using Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation. Rep Comp refers to
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Republicans in competitive districts whereas Rep Non−Comp refers to Republicans
in non-competitive districts and similarly for Democrats. The figure shows that the
ideological score increases as we approach the election both for competitive and non-
competitive districts. Figure 1.16 shows the ideological polarization between Repub-
licans and Democrats a year before and after the election. The ideological difference
is calculated as the difference between the mean ideological score of Republicans, and
Democrats. ID Comp shows the difference in the ideological difference between in
the competitive districts and ID Non− comp shows the ideological difference in the
non-competitive districts. The ideological difference decreases as we approach the
election both for competitive and non-competitive districts.
1.5.4 Mentions Network Analysis
For the fourth part of the ideological metric, I calculate the polarization in
the mentions network in my data set. This gives us an idea about the affective
polarization within the network. Figure 1.17 visually shows the polarization in the
mention network. As we can see, the network is heavily polarized in terms of the
interactions members of the two parties have with one another. Since I want to look
at the change in polarization in a time series fashion, traditional network analysis
measures such as nodes, degree or centrality do not help.
To compute the degree of affective polarization in this network, I compute the
shares of how many times Democrats mention other Republicans over 104 weeks,
and vice-versa20. Figures 1.18a and 1.18b show that both parties mention each other
20To make the analysis more accurate, I collect the handles of all Democrats and Republicans
for the present House and Senate, and also for the previous House, as well as the current and past
President. Therefore, the Republicans whom Democrats mention are Republicans in the current
House of Congress and include Senators and House members in the 115th House of Congress, with
a verified official handle
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more negatively with the approach of the election. However, while there is a drop in
negative mentions of Republicans by Democrats, there is a significant increase in neg-
ative mentions of Democrats by Republicans after the election. Both the estimates,
however, keep falling as we move away from the election. It is important to note
that these are broad level trends, and some of these trends change direction when we
zoom in to the last eight weeks of the election. The results of what happens in the
last eight weeks are discussed in Section 1.6.
1.5.5 Retweet Network Analysis
I compute similar measures of polarization for the retweet network as well.
Figures 1.19a and 1.19b show that the negative retweets of out-group increases as we
approach the election. There is a slight drop in negative retweets of Republicans by
Democrats and a slight increase in negative retweets of Democrats by Republicans
and negative retweets of the out-group decreases as we move away from the election.
1.6 Empirical Analysis
1.6.1 Regression Discontinuity Analysis
After computing the metrics of ideological polarization, I use the non-parametric
Regression Discontinuity Design to see if there is a significant discontinuous jump be-
fore and after the election. I use weeks to the election as my running variable, with the
cut-off at 0 and the metrics that I have already computed as my outcome variables.
The RDD set-up works very well in this scenario. Although the election is not an
exogenous event as is generally the requirement for an RDD, this works in our favour
because we are trying to measure the effect on ideology as soon as the anticipation
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of an impending election goes away. For this reason, I use a non-parametric RDD to
look at only a narrow window before and after the election. A data-driven approach
is used to find the right bandwidths for the regression as outlined in Calonico et al.
(2014).21 I perform non-parametric Regression Discontinuity in Time as performed
in Davis (2008). The results for varying degrees of polynomials used are reported.
The non-parametric RDD in time is estimated using the following equation.
y = f(t) + ε, (1.18)
where y denotes the various metrics that I have calculated and t denotes time in
weeks, and is the running variable.
1.6.1.1 Results
In the RDD estimates, I only find a significant increase in the number of com-
mon hashtags used which shows that Republicans and Democrats start talking about
similar things at a higher rate just after election compared to that before the election
as shown in Table (1.2). None of the other estimates have any significant disconti-
nuities as shown in Tables 1.3 - 1.7. There are some effects in the mention network
analysis and retweet network analysis. Mentioned Dem Negatively estimates by
Republicans increase right after the election, as shown in Table 1.6. In the retweet
network analysis, estimates of Retweeted Rep Negatively by Republicans decreased
right after the election, as shown in Table 1.7.
21I use the rdrobust package in R for the Regression Discontinuity estimation. The package uses
a data-driven methodology to select the best bandwidth
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1.6.2 OLS Estimates for sub sample
It is clear by looking at the smoothed lines in the graphs of the metrics that
they vary considerably depending on where one is in the election cycle. The locally
polynomial regression lines shown in the graphs help us understand how these metrics
vary. Therefore, the metrics give us a sliding window view of what is happening to
polarization at any point in time. As is evident, polarization is different depending
upon where one is in the election cycle, and does not have a long term trend. There-
fore, it does not make much sense to infer the effect of the election by using the entire
time series. Another potential challenge in inferring any causality from these graphs
is that many events can influence politicians’ tweeting behaviour, such as significant
worldwide events or primaries. There could also be potential seasonality effects in
the time series. Therefore, to understand what is happening just before the election,
one needs to focus on a narrow window close to the election.
As a specific case for illustrative purposes, I look at a window of 8 weeks before and
after the election. I choose eight weeks because there are no primaries contested in
the last eight weeks for the federal election. There is also no major worldwide event
to influence politicians’ tweeting behaviour. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that all tweets in the last eight weeks of the election cycle will be about the midterm
election, and this helps us get closer to the effect of the election.
I run a simple linear regression model to estimate the slopes of the ideological
metrics that I have computed before and after the elections. It is important to
note that I am not trying to show causality or compute exact estimates about the
magnitude of change, but I am more interested in the direction of change. The
direction of change sheds light on whether polarization decreases or increases as we
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approach the election. The equation that I estimate is
yt = α + βWeek + ε, (1.19)
where yt represents the various metrics that I computed. I estimate two separate
slope coefficients one before the election and one after the election. For the pre-
election version, Week increases from 1 to 8 as we get closer to the election, with the
8th week being closest to the election. In the post-election version, Week increases
as we get further away from the election. The 8th week is the furthest away from
the election. Another way to think about this would be that Week increases in the
positive direction of the time for the pre-election and post-election specification.
1.6.2.1 Results
The slopes for the hashtag estimates are negative in the last eight weeks of
the election, as shown in Table 1.8. This implies that Democrats and Republicans
decrease their use of similar hashtags as they approach the election conditional on
the top hashtags. The estimates for Hashtag50 and Hashtag100 are significant at
5 percent level. The estimates also decrease as the politicians move away from the
election. However, there is a significant increase in the number of common hashtags
just after the election, as shown in Table 1.2. The slopes of the Inverse Score std
metrics are also negative, implying inverse score falls and therefore distance increases
as we approach the election. This means that as elections get closer, conditional on
using the same hashtags politicians from different parties use increasingly different
sentiments to talk about those hashtags. The slope of the measure is negative after
the election too, but there is an increase in the inverse score as soon as the election
is over as shown in Table 1.2. These measures hint at an increase in polarization or
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movement away from the median voter in anticipation of the election.
Similarly, the slopes of Hellinger distance and the Kullback-Leibler divergence are
positive as shown in Table 1.9 implying an increase in topic divergence. Even when
we focus only on the dominant topics and use the distance between the relative shares
that Democrats and Republicans devote to such topics, the slope is positive implying
that distance increases as we approach the election as shown in Table 1.10. The
combined evidence suggests that Democrats and Republicans increasingly talk about
different agendas with the approach of the election. Therefore, both in the case of
hashtags, which are very context-specific framing devices and broad topics, Democrats
and Republicans grow increasingly divergent with the approach of the election.
However, the results are opposite when we consider the words used in the tweets and
when we augment the topic modelling with sentiment analysis. The Jaccard Distance
slope between word distributions is negative, as shown in Table 1.9. This implies that
politicians increasingly use similar words in their tweets. When the topic analysis is
augmented with sentiment scores, the Euclidean Distance score decreases which means
that politicians increasingly use the same sentiment to talk about different topics as
shown in Table 1.10. Therefore, as implemented through sentiment augmented topic
modelling, the content analysis hints at a decrease in polarization and movement
towards the median voter in anticipation of the election.
The ideological difference between Republicans and Democrats as computed us-
ing the Bayesian ideal point estimation also decreases for competitive and non-
competitive districts, as shown in Table 1.11. The ideological difference in the com-
petitive districts increases after the election, whereas the non-competitive districts’
difference decreases after the election. This also suggests a decrease in polarization
38
and movement towards the median voter as the election approaches.
Negative mentions of Republicans by Democrats increases as we move into the elec-
tion, falls once the election is over, then decreases for some time and increases again
as we move away from the election. Negative mentions of Democrats by Republicans
increases as we move into the election, rises (significantly) once the election is over,
then decreases for some time and increases again as we move away from the election.
Negative retweets of Republicans by Democrats decrease in the last eight weeks of the
election. They fall (significantly) once the election is over, and increase in the eight
weeks after the election. Negative retweets of Democrats by Republicans increase as
we approach the election, decreases after the election and falls after that.
The combined pieces of evidence suggest that while Democrats and Republicans
become more polarized in their agenda-setting behaviour with the approach of the
election, they become less polarized in terms of the content shared within a particular
agenda. Whereas the between-agenda or between-topic variability increases with the
approach of the election, the within-topic variability decreases. One way to think
about this would be that while politicians are trying to appeal to their extreme
electoral bases through their agenda-setting behaviour, they try to appeal to the
median voter or the swing voters by remaining more moderate in their content within
the diverse agendas. This could also be because while faithful voter bases might be
lured by token gestures or the appearance of extremism, more moderate and attentive
voters might need more content to win them over.
39
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I collect tweets from incumbent Representatives in the 116th
House of Congress at a weekly interval one week before and after the 2018 midterm
election. I then use the Twitter data to construct several estimates of political ide-
ology using hashtag analysis, topic modelling, Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation, and
analyze the mention and retweet networks of the politicians.
There are two ways one can interpret the result from this paper. From a Frequentist
perspective, the statistical insignificance of the Regression Discontinuity estimates
and the sub-sample estimates (except for the Hashtag estimates and some of the
network estimates) suggest that there is no discernible discontinuity at the election.
It also implies no significant change in behaviour at the level of discourse either before
or after the election.
However, one could also argue that there is very little variation in the independent
variable for the OLS subsample estimates. Therefore, it is difficult to get precise
estimates with low standard errors. Adopting a Bayesian perspective helps us infer
some patterns from the estimates that can inform our priors which can be later
validated/rejected through a future project. When we use the Bayesian perspective,
we find some interesting patterns. Polarization, as measured by broad level agenda-
setting behaviour such as hashtags or topics, is found to increase with the approach
of the election. However, when we shift our measuring instrument to the similarity
in words used, sentiment augmented topic analysis or ideological scores inferred from
the media sharing activity, we find polarization to decrease with the approach of the
election. This suggests that there is convergence in agenda-specific positioning while
there is increasing divergence in preferred electoral agenda setting.
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A potential future research area would be to repeat this analysis for multiple elec-
tion periods and check if the patterns that we find here repeat in multiple election
periods or if it is something unique to this election period. The methodologies devel-
oped in this paper could also be extended to understand voters’ behaviour and pref-
erences during an upcoming election and get a more accurate understanding about
how voters’ preferences change as we get close to the election.
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1.8 Figures and Tables


















Notes: Difference between mean ideological positions for Republican and Democrat politicians from
1855 to 2019 along dimension 1 of DW-Nominate scores, using data from voteview.com. An almost
similar graph is reproduced by the estimates of dimension 1 constructed by Poole and Rosenthal.
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Notes: The number of active authors (authors who have tweeted atleast one tweet in a week) are
counted for each week. The orange line indicates the election.






















Notes: The total number of tweets are plotted for each week. The orange line indicates the
election.





















Notes: The number of tweets sent out on average each week. The numbers plotted in this graph is
obtained by dividing the total number of tweets by the number of active authors. The orange line
indicates the election.
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Figure 1.5: Similarity in hashtags over time
Before After




















Notes: The figure plots the number of common hashtags used in the top 10, 20, 40, 50 and 100
hashtags used by Republicans and Democrats. The Before facet shows what the trend before the
Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm
election.
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Figure 1.6: Trend of inverse of standardized Euclidean Distance of hashtags interacted
with sentiments
Before After































Notes: The figure inverse of the euclidean distance between negative tweets containing hashtags
between Republicans and Democrats. A higher value implies low polarization whereas a lower
value implies higher polarization. The Before facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th
midterm election, whereas the After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm election.
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Figure 1.7: Token distribution for Topic 1 in Republican tweets
Notes: The top 30 most relevant words used in the first topic in the tweets by Republicans for the
month of 7th November- 7th December, 2017 after fitting the LDA model.
Figure 1.8: Token distribution for Topic 1 in Democrat tweets
Notes: The top 30 most relevant words used in the first topic in the tweets by Democrats for the
month of 7th November- 7th December, 2017 after fitting the LDA model.
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Figure 1.9: Distance metrics over time between Democrat and Republicans
Before After


























Notes: Euclidean distance between the probability distributions after applying the LDA model as
measured by Hellinger, KLD DR, KLD RD. KLD refers to the Kullback Leibler Divergence.
Distance between the words used and the list of words used as measured by JD DR and JD DLRL
respectively. JD refers to the Jaccard distance. The Before facet shows what the trend before the
Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
election.
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Figure 1.10: Euclidean Distance between the dominant topics
Before After

































Notes: Score shows the euclidean distance between the vector of fractions of the tweets by
Republicans and Democrats devoted to the dominant topic calculate at at a weekly basis. The
Before facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the After facet
shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
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Figure 1.11: Number of topics in each week according to the optimal LDA model
Before After
















Notes: The graph shows the smoothed curve over the number of topics every week. The number of
topics when the coherence scores stops increasing is used. The Before facet shows what the trend
before the Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th
midterm.
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Figure 1.12: Euclidean Distance for fraction of positive, negative and neutral senti-
ments in a topic between Democrats and Republicans
Before After

































Notes: Sum Frac Dis measures the euclidean distance between the vector of fractions of tweets
by Democrats and Republicans used with a positive, negative and neutral sentiments. The Before
facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the After facet shows the
trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
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Figure 1.13: Domains which have tweeted relatively more by Democrats compared to
Republicans
Notes: The top 5 domains that Democrats share more relative to Republicans as URLs. The
number on the Y-axis shows the number of weeks that a particular domain has emerged the top
domain.
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Figure 1.14: Domains which have tweeted relatively more by Democrats comapred to
Republicans
Notes: The top 5 domains that Democrats share more relative to Republicans as
URLs. The number on the Y-axis shows the number of weeks that a particular
domain has emerged the top domain.
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Figure 1.15: Mean ideological score over time computed using Bayesian Ideal Point
Estimation
Before After























Notes: Rep Comp and Dem Comp shows the movement of ideological scores for Republicans and
Democrats in competitive districts calculated using Bayesian Ideal Point estimation.
Rep Non-Comp and Dem Non-Comp similarly shows the movement of ideological scores in
non-competitive districts. The Before facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th midterm
election, whereas the After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
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Figure 1.16: Mean ideological polarization over time computed using Bayesian Ideal
Point Estimation.
Before After













Notes: ID Comp is the difference between the mean ideological scores of Republicans and
Democrats in competitive districts whereas ID Non-Comp is the difference in non-competitive
districts. The Before facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the
After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
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Figure 1.17: Polarization in the mention network
Notes: The green colored dots represents Republicans, orange represents
Democrats, and mauve represents non politicians
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Figure 1.18: Trend of negative mentions by parties over time
(a) Trend of negative mentions of Republicans
by Democrats
Before After





















(b) Trend of negative mentions of Democrats
by Republicans
Before After























Notes: The Before facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the
After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
Figure 1.19: Trend of negative retweets by parties over time
(a) Trend of negative retweets of Republicans
by Democrats
Before After




















(b) Trend of negative retweets of Democrats
by Republicans
Before After























Notes: The Before facet shows what the trend before the Nov 6th midterm election, whereas the
After facet shows the trend after the Nov 6th midterm.
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Table 1.1: Top 20 hashtags used by the Democrats and Republicans
Panel A: One week before the election
Democrats Republicans
#forthepeople, #vote #betteroffnow, #jobsreport
#getcovered, #electionday #taxreform, #taxcutsandjobsact
#shirleychisholm, #protectourcare #halloween, #hurricanemichael
#investigatezinke, #unboughtunbossed #ms01, #maga
#govote, #latinaequalpayday #ar3, #happyhalloween
#cultureofcorruption, #latinaequalpay #veterans, #az05
#showupforshabbat, #midterms2018 #jobs, #ga10
#marianastrong, #openenrollment #al03, #mobileoffice
#aca, #yutu #nc06, #electionday
#pda40, #goptaxscam #mi06, #az08
Panel B: One week after the election
Democrats Republicans
#veteransday , #getcovered #veteransday , #campfire
#forthepeople, #woolseyfire #veterans , #marinecorpsbirthday
#veterans , #protectmueller #semperfi, #veteransday2018
#veteransday2018 , #trump #ar3, #findyourpark
#enoughisenough, #thousandoaks #al03, #az05
#mueller, #daca #ruralbizsummit, #betteroffnow
#counteveryvote, #hillfire #floridarecount2018, #thankaveteran
#thxbirthcontrol, #wwi #ms01, #ar4
#followthefacts, #yutu #semperfidelis, #wwi
#gunviolence, #diwali #nationaladoptionmonth, #nc06
Notes: Panel A shows the top 20 hashtags used by Republicans and Democrats
one week before the election. The common hashtags are italicized and underlined.
#electionday is the only common hashtag used by both Democrats and Republicans
one week before the election. Panel B shows the top 20 hashtags used by Republicans
and Democrats one week after the election. The common hashtags are #veteransday,
#veterans, #veteransday2018 and #wwi.
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Table 1.2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Hashtag Analysis
Panel A: RDD Estimates for Hashtag Similarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Hashtag10 Hashtag20 Hashtag40 Hashtag50 Hashtag100
1 1.454 3.049*** 3.389** 5.192*** 12.048***
(1.094) (0.983) (1.711) (1.648) (2.859)
2 3.586* 4.481*** 6.278** 8.703*** 17.272***
(1.650) (1.438) (2.687) (2.567) (3.323)
3 3.296 4.330*** 6.753** 9.189*** 17.604***
(1.723) ( 1.617) (3.190) (2.963) (4.249)
4 4.128* 4.163** 5.252 3.895 19.551***
(1.851) (1.774) (3.838) (3.820) (4.862)
N 104 104 104 104 104
Panel B: RDD Estimates for Inverse Score std estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Inv Score std10Inv Score std20Inv Score std40Inv Score std50Inv Score std100
1 3.050 6.967 0.074 -0.644 -3.344
(12.147) (8.164) (5.578) (6.207) (3.808)
2 0.687 17.341 6.839 5.391 5.076
(13.902) (16.117) (8.481) (9.381) (3.732)
3 10.732 19.138 3.968 6.733 11.191
(24.855) (18.158) (9.968) (10.767) (9.210)
4 15.846 33.235 10.372 9.757 12.517
(31.479) (23.568) (9.840) (11.194) (10.283)
N 104 104 104 104 104
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hashtag similarity is defined as the number of common hashtags used by
Democrats and Republicans conditional on the top hashtags used by them.
Inverse Score std is the inverse of distance between fraction of negative tweets for
the Republicans and Democrats out of all the tweets that use a similar hashtag stan-
dardized for the number of topics. I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a
data driven bandwidth selection method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and
4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 1.3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Euclidean distance measures be-
tween topic distributions and word distributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Hellinger KLDDR KLDRD JDDR JDDLRL
1 -0.059 -0.060 -0.070 -0.018 -0.015*
(0.051) (0.053) (0.062) (0.015) (0.008)
2 -0.070 -0.072 -0.085 -0.006 -0.012
( 0.062) (0.067) (0.077) (0.028) (0.011)
3 -0.095 -0.100 -0.108 -0.005 -0.004
(0.065) (0.068) (0.080) (0.035) (0.018)
4 -0.081 -0.099 -0.105 -0.010 -0.007
( 0.086) (0.085) (0.118) (0.041) (0.018)
N 104 104 104 104 104
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hellinger Distance and the KLDDR and KLDRD measure the distance between
the topic distributions after implementing the LDA model on the content of the
tweets. The JDDR and JDDLRL measures the distance between the word distributions
used by the Democrats and Republicans in their tweets. I perform a non-parametric
RDD in Time using a data driven bandwidth selection method. The estimates are
reported for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 1.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Euclidean Distance and Euclidean
distance interacted with sentiment for dominant topic












Panel B: RDD Estimates for sentiment augmented Euclidean distance
(1)










[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Score is defined as the euclidean distance between the vectors of fraction of each
topic(dominant topic in each tweet) for the Democrats and Republican tweets for each
week.Sum Frac Dis is the euclidean distance for each topic between Republicans
and Democrats, after controlling for the sentiment of the topics. I perform a non-
parametric RDD in Time using a data driven bandwidth selection method. The
estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 1.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Bayesian Ideal Point(BIP) Esti-
mates for politicians and Ideological Difference in competitive and non-competitive
districts
Panel A: RDD Estimates for BIP Estimates for politicians
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Degree Rep Comp Dem Comp Rep Non-Comp Dem Non-Comp
1 -0.308 -0.264 -0.428 -0.122
(0.399) (0.450) (0.305) (0.346)
2 -0.259 0.268 -0.172 0.232
(0.474) (0.920) (0.524) (0.709)
3 0.102 0.297 0.236 0.245
(0.746) ( 1.032) ( 0.735) (0.684)
4 0.104 -0.109 0.376 0.142
( 0.841) (1.683) (0.853) (1.100)
N 104 104 104 104
Panel B: RDD Estimates for Ideological Difference
(1) (2)










[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Footnote 2: In Panel A Rep Comp and Dem Comp shows the mean ide-
ological score for all Republicans and Democrats respectively in competitive
districts.Rep Non−Comp and Dem Non−Comp shows the mean ideological score
for all Republicans and Democrats respectively in non-competitive districts. In Panel
B IdeologicalDiff Comp and IDeologicalDiff Non − Comp shows the difference
between mean Republican and Democrat ideological scores in competitive and non-
competitive districts respectively. I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a
data driven bandwidth selection method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and
4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 1.6: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Mention Network Analysis
























[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A Rep Negatively are shares of how many times Republicans are men-
tioned negatively relative to all mentions of Republicans by the Democrat politicians.
In Panel B Dem Negatively are shares of how many times Democrats are men-
tioned negatively relative to all mentions of Democrats by the Republican politicians.
I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a data driven bandwidth selection
method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 1.7: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Retweet Network Analysis
























[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A Rep Negatively are shares of how many times Republicans are
retweeted negatively relative to all retweets of Republicans by the Democrat politi-
cians. In Panel B Dem Negatively are shares of how many times Democrats are
retweeted negatively relative to all retweets of Democrats by the Republican politi-
cians. I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a data driven bandwidth
selection method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomi-
als.
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Table 1.8: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Hashtag Analysis














Panel B: Estimates of forInverse Score std estimates
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Inv Score 10std -2.279 -6.285
(1.543) (4.426)
Inv Score 20std -0.514 -2.979
(0.8651) (1.087)
Inv Score 40std -0.368 -0.348
(0.6268) (0.3469)
Inv Score 50std -0.262 -0.587
(0.7059) (0.3062)
Inv Score 100std -0.288 -0.486
(0.1866) (0.1836)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hashtag similarity is defined as the number of common hashtags used by
Democrats and Republicans conditional on the top hashtags used by them.
Inverse Score std is the inverse of distance between fraction of negative tweets for
the Republicans and Democrats out of all the tweets that use a similar hashtag stan-
dardized for the number of topics. The Before column shows the estimates for 8 weeks
before the election whereas the After column shows the estimates for 8 weeks after
the election.
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KLD DR 0.0064 -0.004
(0.0057) (0.0035)
KLD RD 0.008 -0.004
(0.0064) (0.0035)
JD DR -0.006 0.0028
(0.0017) (0.0031)
JD DLRL -0.003 0.0008
(0.0013) (0.0028)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hellinger Distance and the KLDDR and KLDRD measure the distance between
the topic distributions after implementing the LDA model on the content of the
tweets. The JDDR and JDDLRL measures the distance between the word distributions
used by the Democrats and Republicans in their tweets. The Before column shows
the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas the After column shows the
estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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Table 1.10: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Euclidean Distance and Euclidean distance
interacted with sentiment for dominant topic






Panel B: Estimates for sentiment augmented Euclidean distance
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Sum Frac Dis 0.0111 0.0262
(0.0557) (0.0259)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2]Score is defined as the euclidean distance between the vectors of fraction of each
topic(dominant topic in each tweet) for the Democrats and Republican tweets for each
week. Sum Frac Dis is the euclidean distance for each topic between Republicans
and Democrats after controlling for the sentiment of the topics. The Before column
shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas the After column shows
the estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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Table 1.11: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Bayesian Ideal Point(BIP) Estimates for
politicians and Ideological Difference in competitive and non-competitive districts
Panel A: Estimates for BIP Estimates for politicians
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Rep Comp -0.055 -0.021
(0.0756) (0.0732)
Dem Comp -0.008 -0.107
(0.1056) (0.076)
Rep Non-Comp -0.04 -0.065
(0.0664) (0.0813)
Dem Non-Com -0.039 -0.04
(0.0811) (0.0626)
N 8 8
Panel B: Estimates for Ideological Difference
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
ID Comp -0.047 0.0865
(0.0363) (0.0511)
ID Non-Comp -0.001 -0.025
(0.0375) (0.0313)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A Rep Comp and Dem Comp shows the mean ideological score for all
Republicans and Democrats respectively in competitive districts.Rep Non − Comp
and Dem Non − Comp shows the mean ideological score for all Republicans and
Democrats respectively in non-competitive districts. In Panel B ID Comp and
ID Non− Comp shows the difference between mean Republican and Democrat ide-
ological scores in competitive and non-competitive districts respectively. The Before
column shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas the After column
shows the estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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Table 1.12: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Mention Network Analysis
Panel A: Estimates for Mentions by Democrats
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Rep Negatively 0.0134 -5E-04
(0.0127) (0.0134)
N 8 8
Panel B: Estimates of mentions by Republicans
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Dem Negatively 0.0087 -0.036
(0.0069) (0.0198)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A Rep Negatively are shares of how many times Republicans are men-
tioned negatively relative to all mentions of Republicans by the Democrat politicians.
In Panel B Dem Negatively are shares of how many times Democrats are mentioned
negatively relative to all mentions of Democrats by the Republican politicians. The
Before column shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas the After
column shows the estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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Table 1.13: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Retweet Network Analysis
Panel A: Estimates for Retweets by Democrats
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Rep Negatively -0.014 0.0198
(0.0524) (0.0566)
N 8 8
Panel B: Estimates for Retweets by Republicans
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Dem Negatively 0.006 -0.015
(0.0431) (0.0682)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A Rep Negatively are shares of how many times Republicans are
retweeted negatively relative to all retweets of Republicans by the Democrat politi-
cians. In Panel B Dem Negatively are shares of how many times Democrats are
retweeted negatively relative to all retweets of Democrats by the Republican politi-
cians. The Before column shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas




Polarization in 2019 Lok Sabha
Elections from India. Evidence
from Twitter Data
2.1 Introduction
Political partisanship affects not only voting outcomes but also impacts politi-
cal and economic outcomes. Two different theories of short-run political partisanship
have been proposed in the literature. One of the theories that assume that political
parties are only motivated to hold office and win elections predict policy convergence
to the median voter’s preferences. However, other studies which assume ideologically
motivated politicians or non-binding commitment devices predict policy divergence.
Although some studies have tried to test these two hypotheses empirically, there has
been no work done in the Indian context.
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The political climate in India is going through some turbulent times. Popular news
media and recent events suggest that there has been growing polarization in India
in recent times. International media has also been cognizant of this development.
An article by Masih and Staler, 2019 in The Washington Post talks about U.S style
polarization spreading to India. They talk about how every issue is now viewed using
a partisan lens, how social media has become a place for acrimony and how political
debates have strained personal relationships. Gettleman et al. (2019) wrote an article
in The New York Times about the rise of communal tensions, hate speech and trolling
in India. These events have also contributed to increase in perceived polarization. In
recent times, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) passed on 11th December 2019,
suspension of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, viral videos of mob lynching events
where Hindu extremists allegedly killed Muslims are some incidents that have caused
widespread protests in the country. The passing of the CAA has seen some of the
most consistent and large scale protests organized by civil societies that the country
has witnessed in a long time. There have also been isolated incidents of violence
which took a monstrous form on 23rd February 2020 in Delhi. It was one of the most
devastating communal riots in decades. Fifty-three people are supposed to have died
according to an NPR article published on 7th March 2020.
The spurt of such news in prestigious media organizations warrants an immediate
study of the subject. Therefore, my research question is to look at political polar-
ization between the politicians of the two main political parties in India in the event
of the May 2019 election. My contribution in this paper is two-fold. First, I help
test the policy convergence versus policy divergence hypothesis, using Indian data,
which has not been attempted yet. This is the only paper to compute high-frequency
ideological estimates of polarization in a time series fashion for India. Second, this
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work is crucial for the Indian context. Unlike some developed countries like the USA,
which has the DW-Nominate scores to measure political ideology, India has no such
measure, and this study could help fill that void.
Twitter data is an excellent source of data to identify this kind of variation for
several reasons. Twitter data helps us gain insight into the political discourse at
very short intervals, almost week by week. The previous chapter provides a detailed
exposition on this.
To quantify the degree of polarization in the political system in India during the
2019 Lok Sabha elections, I look at the Twitter feed of politicians from two major
national parties in India viz. the Bharatiya Janata Party henceforth referred to as
BJP and the Indian National Congress henceforth referred to as the INC. India has a
multi-party system along with a federal structure. Subsequently, it has many political
parties both at the national and the regional level. However, it is difficult to do a
comprehensive study of all such parties in one single paper. I choose to focus on the
BJP and INC, the two major political parties with a pan India presence, as explained
later in the paper. Another reason for choosing these two parties is that most small
and regional parties generally enter into an alliance or a coalition with these two
major parties to form the government or the opposition. Therefore, looking at the
political polarization between these parties gives us a close albeit imperfect measure
of political, ideological differences expressed through rhetoric.
To approximate the degree of polarization, I compute several metrics using hash-
tag analysis, topic modelling, Bayesian Ideal Point estimation, and mention network
analysis of the BJP and INC politicians’ Twitter feeds. I look at the Twitter feeds of
politicians who won in the 2019 election and have a verified Twitter profile. Using a
72
verified profile ensures that we do not find much cheap talk and add more legitimacy
to the tweets.
2.2 Background And Literature Review
2.2.1 Institutional Background
India was a British colony until 1947. On 15th August 1947, India got its
independence and was divided into India and Pakistan. Pakistan was later divided
into Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1971.
Michelutti (2007) summarizes the history of Indian post-colonial politics in the
following way. From Independence to 1967 the party system was dominated by the
Congress party, also known as the Indian National Congress (INC). It was an inclu-
sive secular party supported by upper castes, lower castes, and different religious and
ethnic communities. From 1967 to 1993, although Congress remained dominant at
the national level, they faced more meaningful opposition at the state and regional
levels. The Janata Party, a coalition of opposition parties, took office in 1977, and
then in 1989, the Congress was defeated again by a new coalition of the National
Front/Janata Dal. Thirdly, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Indian party sys-
tem moved from a one-dominant party system to a genuine competitive multi-party
system. Regional parties began to capture a more significant share of votes, and they
started to mobilize members of lower castes. Parallel to this trend (and sometimes
in opposition), this period also saw the rise of Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). BJP was in office at the national level from 1996 to 2004 either
as a minority government or in coalition with regional parties. In 2004 the Bharatiya
Janata Party lost the parliamentary elections, and Congress and its allies won. India
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experienced a very high sustained growth rate in the next decade, which was divided
in two periods 2003-04 to 2007-08 and another brief period in 2009-10 and 2010-11,
Dasgupta (2020). The economy however had a slowdown from 2011-12, Subramanian
(2019). In 2014, the BJP won on anti-incumbency advantage. Scams caused by the
Congress government, Kumar (2018) and the charisma of the current prime minister
Narendra Modi, Jaffrelot (2015) made BJP win comfortably. In the current election
of 2019, most people again rode high on the charisma on the Modi effect, BJP’s orga-
nizational advantage, nationalist sentiment and expansive welfare policies, Chhibber
and Verma (2019). An attack in Pulwama on Indian army by alleged terrorists led to
the alleged killing of terrorists in Pakistan by the Indian Air Force. This also proved
to be an essential factor for BJP’s win in the 2019 election, where they won by a
clear majority and did not need the support of any political party to form a coalition
government.
It is clear from the discussion above that BJP and INC are the two major political
parties in India who have a pan India presence. Table 2.1 shows the seat distribution
by parties in different states of India from 1984 to 2019 at the national level. This
covers a total of ten general elections or the Lok Sabha elections. The table shows
that BJP and INC are the two parties who have won the highest number of seats for
most states. Therefore, I look at political polarization between politicians of INC and
BJP only, because these are the only two parties to have had a pan India presence.
India has a bicameral legislature system, with two Parliament houses, the Rajya
Sabha (the Upper House) and the Lok Sabha (the Lower House). The Lok Sabha
members are elected directly by the people, whereas the members of the Rajya Sabha
are appointed. The Lok Sabha has more power than the Rajya Sabha. The maximum
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strength of the House envisaged by the Constitution is 552, which is made up by
the election of up to 530 members to represent the States, up to 20 members to
represent the Union Territories and not more than two members of the Anglo-Indian
Community to be nominated by the Hon’ble President, if, in his/her opinion, that
community is not adequately represented in the House. The total elective membership
is distributed among the States so that the ratio between the number of seats allotted
to each State and the population of the State is, so far as practicable, the same for
all States.
The winning party chooses the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister chooses his/her
council of ministers entrusted with ministries, such as Ministry of Human Resources
and Development, Finance Ministry and others.
The 2019 Indian general election was held in seven phases from 11 April to 19 May
2019 to constitute the 17th Lok Sabha. Five hundred forty-three seats were contested.
The votes were counted, and the result declared on 23 May 2019. About 910 million
people were eligible to vote, and voter turnout was over 67 per cent – the highest ever,
and the highest ever participation by women voters. The Bharatiya Janata Party
won 303 seats, further increasing its substantial majority and the BJP-led National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) won 353 seats. The BJP won 37.36 percent of votes. The
Indian National Congress won 52 seats, and the INC-led United Progressive Alliance
won 91. Other parties and their alliances won 98 seats.
2.3 Data
In this paper, I collect the official Twitter handles of all politicians from the
BJP and INC who have won in the 2019 election. India does not have an official
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web page for elected politicians. Therefore, I searched for the politician’s name and
choose the official handle after matching the face, credentials and ensuring that it is
a verified account. There are 120 official BJP handles, and 15 official INC handles
in my data-set. I collect weekly tweets from 12th April 2018 to 20th May 2020. In
essence, I collect data for one year before the starting date of the election and one
year after the election’s end date. The number of Twitter handles in my data-set for
approximately 40 percent of the BJP politicians and 29 percent of the INC politicians
who won the 2019 election.
Since India is a country of many languages, politicians use several different lan-
guages to communicate with the electorate. However, Hindi and English are the
major languages of communication, especially in central elections. For BJP, whose
main voter base is in northern India where the majority of Hindi speaking population
resides, Hindi seems an obvious language choice. I collect tweets made in English as
well as tweets made in Hindi between 12th April 2018 to 20th May 2020. Figure 2.1
shows the number of active politicians every week. An active politician is defined as
someone who has tweeted in that week. As shown in the graph, there is an almost
similar number of active BJP politicians tweeting in Hindi and English. In contrast,
in INC, the politicians mostly tweeted in English with only a couple of politicians
tweeting in Hindi.
Figure 2.2 shows the total tweets by BJP and INC politicians made every week.
Again, as can be seen through the figure, BJP politicians make an almost equal
number of tweets in Hindi and English compared to INC politicians who make most
of their tweets in English. Figure 2.3 shows the number of tweets made on average
by an active politician in a particular week. The INC politicians make almost the
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same number of average tweets in English as the BJP makes in English and Hindi
but hardly tweet in Hindi.
2.4 Computation of Ideological Estimates
I perform the same analysis for the tweets that I performed for the US data.
A detailed exposition of my motivation for these techniques can be found in the first
chapter.
2.4.1 Hashtag Analysis
To start off with the computation of metrics of polarization, I look at the
similarity in hashtags used. Hashtag similarity is defined as the number of common
hashtags used by BJP and INC politicians conditional on the top hashtags used by
them. To compute the hashtag similarity, I proceed in the following way: First, I
extract the top 40 hashtags used by BJP in a week. Let us denote this set of hashtags
by B40. Second I extract the top 40 hashtags used by INC in a week.
1 Let us denote
this set of hashtags by I40. I then compute the number of similar hashtags between
the sets B40 and I40. Let us denote this by Hashtag40. In other words,
Hashtag40 = n(B40 ∩ I40), (2.1)
where n(.) denotes the cardinal number. I also compute Hashtag10, Hashtag20,
Hashtag50, Hashtag100 for robustness checks.
1I convert all the hashtags to lower case because sometimes the same hashtags can be written in
different cases.
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Figure 2.4 shows the trend of these metrics over the election cycle. The Before
segment refers to the period before the election, the Election segment refers to the
weeks during which election was being conducted and the After segment refers to
the period after the election. I use the English tweets for this figure. The figure
looks similar when I use the English and Hindi tweets as shown in the Appendix.
Number of common hashtags increases as the election approaches, except for the top
100 hashtag. This gives some evidence that unlike the US case, politicians from BJP
and INC talk about similar agendas as the election approaches. However, the pattern
is less consistent than it was for the US election. This probably happens because
Indian politicians are not very well versed in using hashtags, compared to their US
counterparts. However, taking recent events in India into consideration they seem to
be getting better and more tactical in the usage of hashtags with each passing day.
2.4.1.1 Sentiment augmented Euclidean Distance between hashtags
To combine the hashtag analysis with the sentiment analysis, I compute the
distance between fraction of negative tweets for the BJP and INC politicians out of all
the tweets that use a similar hashtag. Again, a detailed motivation of this technique
is discussed in the first chapter.
To apply the technique to the US data, assume that there are s common topics in
the top 40 hashtags used by BJP and INC. Therefore, the length of Hashtag40 which
we have already defined is s. I now construct two vectors I40s and B40s . Let the first
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Tweets by INC which contain the first hashtag




Tweets by INC which contain the first hashtag
in top 40 hashtags
)
 , (2.2)
where n denotes the cardinal number. I similarly compute all the elements for
I40s and B40s , and find the Euclidean Distance between these two vectors. This is
denoted by Score40, where Score40 is defined as follows:
Score40 = d(I40s , B40s) =
√
(I40s(1)−B40s(1))2 + (I40s(2)−B40s(2))2 + ...
+ (I40s(s)−B40s(s))2
. (2.3)
After this, I standardize the scores by the number of common hashtags by dividing
Score by the square root of the number of common hashtags. For example, Score40std





I similarly also compute Score10std , Score20std , Score50std and Score100std . The reason
behind focusing only on negative sentiments is explained in the previous chapter.
Another point to note is that in doing the actual analysis I use the inverse of
Score10 and Score10std , which I refer to as Inv Score 10 and Inv Score 10std. This
is done because if there are no common hashtags for any of the groups, then distance
would be calculated as 0, but that does not make sense because a distance close to
0 implies no polarization whereas 0 common hashtags does not imply the same. To
resolve this ambiguity I take the inverse of the score, such that a high score means
less polarization and low score means high polarization. When there are no common
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hashtags the metric is set to a value of 0, as no common hashtags imply the greatest
degree of polarization.
Figure 2.5 shows the patterns in the inverse of the standardized scores. The graph
shows that as we approach the election the inverse of the Euclidean distance increases,
which means that conditional on using the same hashtags BJP and INC politicians
use them with similar sentiments, although there is some discrepancy between the
different lines. The sentiments used in the top hashtags become similar as the elec-
tion approaches, although there is some inconsistency in the pattern. But broadly
speaking, it seems that Indian politicians are not using extremely divisive hashtags
in their top hashtags especially in the top 10, 20 and 40 top hashtags. This probably
is an artifact of the fact that Indian politicians are not heavy hashtag users in the
first place.
2.4.2 Topic Modelling
To perform topic modelling, I apply the model of Latent Dirichlet Allocation
(LDA) to my corpora of tweets. The procedure of implementing a LDA is described
in detail in the first chapter of the dissertation. Whereas I applied the LDA model
to Democrat and Republican tweets in the first chapter, I apply the same technique
to BJP and INC tweets here.
2.4.2.1 Computation of Distance Metrics
I compute measures of similarity and dissimilarity between the two topic prob-
ability distributions obtained after running the trained LDA model (trained on the
pooled tweets of BJP and INC politicians) separately on BJP and INC tweets. The
three measures which are used to measure the distance are the Hellinger distance,
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Kullback-Leibler divergence and the Jaccard distance which are explained in the pre-
vious chapter. The Hellinger distance and the Kullback-Leibler divergence is used to
measure the distance between the topic probability distributions, whereas the Jaccard
distance measures the distance between the word distributions.
Figure 2.6 shows the patterns in these distance based metrics over the election
cycle. The Hellinger distace is denoted by Hellinger whereas the Kullback-Leibler
Divergence is denoted by KLD BI and KLD IB because it is not a symmetric distance
measure. The Jaccard Distance between the raw word distributions used by BJP and
INC is denoted by J BI whereas the distance between the vectors containing list of
words used by BJP and INC is denoted by JL BI. As can be seen in the figure the
distance between the topic distributions as well as the word distributions increases
as we approach the election. This suggests that politicians talk about different topics
and use different words as we approach the election.
2.4.2.2 Euclidean Distance for the dominant topic
The LDA model assigns each tweet to multiple topics. For the next part of
the analysis, I find the dominant topic for each tweet and assign the tweet to that
particular topic. I calculate the Euclidean Distance between the vectors of fraction
of tweets devoted to each topic by the BJP and INC for each week. For example, if
there are s topics in a particular week, I obtain two vectors Is and Bs for that week.
Both these vectors have s elements. Let the first element of Is vector be denoted by
Is(1). Then,
Is(1) =
n(Tweets by INC which belong to topic 1)
n(Total tweets by INC)
, (2.5)
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where n denotes the cardinal number. I similarly compute all the elements of Is
and Bs and find the Euclidean Distance between these two vectors. This distance is
denoted by Score which is calculated as follows.
Score = d(Is, Bs) =
√
(Is(1)−Bs(1))2 + (Is(2)−Bs(2))2 + ...
+ (Is(s)−Bs(s))2
(2.6)






Score helps in understanding the between topic variability in the dominant topics
used by BJP and INC. A low value of Score implies that both the parties devote
similar weights to the various dominant topics they use in their tweets whereas a
higher value of Score implies that they talk about different topics.
Figure 2.7 shows the patterns in the Score and Scorestd variable. With the ap-
proach of the election, Scorestd increases, suggesting that politicians talk about dif-
ferent topics with the approach of the election, suggesting an increase in polarization.
2.4.2.3 Euclidean Distance Interacted with Sentiments
The Euclidean Distance helps us understand the pattern in the usage of topics
by BJP and INC but provide no insight into how these topics are being used. To
make more sense of the intent of the content used for each topic, I perform sentiment
augmented content analysis and compute two types of metrics where sentiment is
interacted with the topic. These measures give us a low value if BJP and INC
politicians talk about the same topic with similar sentiments, and gives us a high
value if they talk about the same topic using different sentiments. The two approaches
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that I take are as follows.
In the first case, I compute the fraction of positive, negative and neutral shares for
each topic for BJP and INC separately, then compute the euclidean distance for each
topic between BJP and INC politicians, and add the distances for all the topics. For
example, if there are s topics in a particular week, I compute 6 vectors PositiveIs ,
NegativeIs , NeutralIs , PositiveBs , NegativeBs , NeutralBs with s elements each. The




Tweets by INC which belong to topic 1
and have a positive sentiment
)
n(Total tweets by INC which belong to topic 1)
, (2.8)
where n denotes the cardinal number. I similarly compute all the other vectors. My
first measure Sum Frac Dis is defined as follows,
Sum Frac Dis =
d(PositiveIs , PositiveBs) + d(NegativeIs , NegativeBS)
+ d(NeutralIs , NeutralBs)
, (2.9)
where d(., .) denotes the Euclidean distance between two vectors.
I also computed a standardized version of Sum Frac Dis which is defined as fol-
lows,




Second, instead of computing the fractions of positive tweets for a particular topic
for each group, I use the intensity of the sentiment to derive the metric for Euclidean
distance. Therefore, instead of counting the number of positive, negative or neutral
tweets for each group, I compute the intensity of positivity, negativity and neutrality
in the tweets. For s topics, I again compute the six vectors PositiveIs , NegativeIs ,
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NeutralIs , PositiveBs , NegativeBs , NeutralBs . The first element for PositiveIs ,
denoted by PositiveIs(1) is defined as follows,
PositiveIs(1) =
Mean value of positive score for tweets by INC
which had a positive sentiment and belonged to topic 1
(2.11)
The metric, Sum Dis is then calculated as follows,
Sum Dis =
d(PositiveIs , PositiveBs) + d(NegativeIs , NegativeBs)
+ d(NeutralIs , NeutralBs)
, (2.12)
where d(., .) denotes the Euclidean distance between two vectors.





Figure 2.8 shows that sentiment augmented topic distance falls as we approach the
election as shown by the patterns in Sum Frac Dis and Sum Frac Disstd. Unlike
the Score and Scorestd metric, the value of Sum Frac Dis and Sum Frac Disstd
falls as approach the election. This suggests that BJP and INC politicians use similar
sentiment to talk about common topics as we approach the election. We get the same
trends when we use the intensity of emotions. The figure is shown in the Appendix.
2.4.3 Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation
The third way by which I try to capture the short-run polarization is through
computation of ideological estimates of the politicians using URLs that they share
in their tweets by the method of Bayesian ideal point estimation. The method is
explained in details in the previous chapter.
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Figure 2.9 shows that as election approaches both INC and BJP become more
like BJP in their URL sharing behavior. Although the distinction between liberal or
conservative is not so clear in the Indian context, BJP is considered to be the more
conservative party, and hence one can say that both parties become more conservative
as election approaches. This is similar to the U.S context. However, after the election,
ideological estimates drop and begin to increase again. This is dissimilar to the U.S
context where the ideological estimates drop and keeps decreasing for sometime after
the election. Figure 2.10 shows that ideological polarization increases as election
approaches in India, and this in stark contrast to the U.S data where the polarization
decreases as election approaches
2.4.4 Mentions Network Analysis
For the fourth part of ideological metric, I calculate the polarization in the
mentions network in my data set. This gives us an idea about the affective polarization
within the network. To compute the degree of affective polarization in this network, I
compute the shares of how many times BJP politicians mention other INC politicians
negatively over the span of 104 weeks, and vice-versa.
Figure 2.11a shows that negative mentions of BJP politicians by INC politicians
decreases as the election approaches. Figure 2.11b shows that negative mentions of
INC politicians by BJP politicians also decreases as the election approaches. This is




2.5.1 Regression Discontinuity Analysis
I use the non-parametric Regression Discontinuity Design as explained in the
first chapter to find if there is a significant discontinuity before and after the election.
Since the elections in India are conducted for over a month, I look at what happens
to the estimates before and after the election ignoring the election period. This
could possibly have the effect of making significant effects undetectable but since the
number of politicians with a verified Twitter profile in India is so less, I do not have
the luxury to subset the data by election dates.
2.5.1.1 Results
For the RDD estimates, I find a significant decrease in common hashtags for
the top 10 hashtags and and a significant increase in common hashtags for the top 50
hashtags as shown in Table 2.2. There is also a significant drop in similarity of words
used before and after the election as shown in Table 2.4. Also, we find that the BJP
politicians become significantly less conservative after the election and ideological
difference between BJP and INC politicians falls significantly after the election as
shown in Table 2.5 Panel A and Table 2.5 Panel B respectively. None of the other
estimates have any significant discontinuities as shown in Tables 2.2 - 2.6.
2.5.2 OlS Estimates for sub sample
To look at what happens close to the election, I employ a similar strategy
of focusing close to the election. Although for the US election, I chose 8 weeks to
make sure that I did not capture any effect from the primaries. India does not have
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any election analogous to the primaries, and hence the choice of 8 weeks is not so
much a strategic choice in India, as it is to just maintain comparability with the US.
Therefore, to look at what happens before and after the election I zoom into 8 weeks
before and after the election.
2.5.2.1 Results
Table 2.7 shows that slope estimates for similarity in hashtags increases as we
approach the election, except for the top 100 hashtags, although the estimates are
not significant. The slope estimates for the inverse score metrics however increase as
we approach the election meaning that conditional on using the same hashtags BJP
and INC politicians use similar sentiments to talk about those hashtags. Therefore
both these estimates suggest a decrease in polarization as they approach the election.
The Euclidean Distance between the topic probability distributions and word distri-
butions increases as the election approaches as shown in Table 2.8. Even on focusing
on the most dominant topic for each tweet the Euclidean distance between the share
of tweets devoted to each topic by BJP and INC politicians increases as the elec-
tion approaches as shown in Table 2.9, suggesting that politicians do become more
polarized with respect to their agenda setting behaviour with the approach of the
election. However, when the topic analysis is complemented with sentiment analysis,
the sentiment augmented Euclidean Distance decreases as we approach the election.
This is similar to the results observed in the U.S context and shows that politicians
diverge in their agenda setting behaviour but converge in the sentiments used for a
particular topic.
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The ideological scores for the both the BJP and INC politicians becomes signifi-
cantly more conservative as the election approaches as shown in Table 2.10, whereas
the ideological difference increases as the election approaches as shown in Table 2.10.
Negative mentions of BJP politicians by INC politicians and INC politicians by
BJP politicians decreases as we approach the election.
The combined pieces of evidence suggests similar patterns in India as we found in
USA. Politicians diverge in their agenda setting behaviour while converging in the
agenda-item specific positioning. Some points of departure from the US results are
that ideological difference as measured by Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation increases
with the approach of the election in India while it decreases in USA. The hashtag
analysis for India also has some contradictory results depending on whether one is
looking at the top 10, 20, 40, 50 or 100 hashtags. The reason for this is the relatively
lower use of hashtags in India by mainstream politicians leading to a lot of hetero-
geneity in the numbers. Another point of departure between the US and India is that
conditional on using the same hashtags, politicians from opposing political parties in
US use different sentiments to talk about the same hashtags whereas politicians from
opposing political parties use similar sentiments to talk about the same hashtags with
the approach of the election.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I collect tweets from BJP and INC politicians in India one year
before and after the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. The tweets are then used to compute
measures of ideological polarization.
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My results show broadly that while politicians diverge in the agendas that they
talk about with the approach of the election, they converge in the sentiments they
use to talk about those topics. The results of the analysis in the Indian context are
consistent with the results from the US context while looking at the content of the
tweets. However, the results from the hashtag analysis, cited media ideology analysis
as well as the mention network analysis is different from the US context.
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2.7 Figures and Tables

























Notes: The number of active authors (authors who have tweeted atleast one tweet in a week) are
counted for each week. The red vertical lines indicate the election.
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Notes: The total number of tweets are plotted for each week. The red vertical lines indicate the
election.


























Notes: The number of tweets sent out on average each week. The numbers plotted in this graph is
obtained by dividing the total number of tweets by the number of active authors. The red vertical
line indicates the election.
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Figure 2.4: Similarity in hashtags over time
Before Election After




















Notes: The figure plots the number of common hashtags used in the top 10, 20, 40, 50 and 100
hashtags used by BJP and INC politicians in English tweets. The Before facet shows the pattern
before the election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election whereas the After
facet shows the pattern after election.
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Figure 2.5: Trend of inverse of standardized Euclidean Distance of hashtags interacted
with sentiments
Before Election After






























Notes: The figure inverse of the euclidean distance between negative tweets containing hashtags
between BJP and INC politicians in English tweets. A higher value implies low polarization
whereas a lower value implies higher polarization.The Before facet shows the pattern before the
election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election whereas the After facet shows
the pattern after election.
93
Figure 2.6: Distance metrics over time between BJP and INC politicians
Before Election After

























Notes: Euclidean distance between the probability distributions after applying the LDA model as
measured by Hellinger, KLD DR, KLD RD. KLD refers to the Kullback Leibler Divergence.
Distance between the words used and the list of words used as measured by JD DR and JD DLRL
respectively. JD refers to the Jaccard distance. The Before facet shows the pattern before the
election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election whereas the After facet shows
the pattern after election.
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Figure 2.7: Euclidean Distance between the dominant topics
Before Election After













Notes: Score shows the euclidean distance between the vector of fractions of the tweets by the BJP
and INC politicians devoted to the dominant topic calculate at at a weekly basis whereas
Score standardized shows the standardized version as explained in the text. The Before facet
shows the pattern before the election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election
whereas the After facet shows the pattern after election.
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Figure 2.8: Euclidean Distance for fraction of positive, negative and neutral senti-
ments in a topic between the BJP and INC politicians
Before Election After












Notes: Sum Frac Dis measures the euclidean distance between the vector of fractions of tweets
by BJP and INC politicians used with a positive, negative and neutral sentiments at a weekly basis
whereas Sum Frac Disstd shows the standardized version as explained in the text. The Before
facet shows the pattern before the election, the Election period shows the pattern during the
election whereas the After facet shows the pattern after election.
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Figure 2.9: Mean ideological score over time computed using Bayesian Ideal Point
Estimation
Before Election After




















Notes: BJP and INC shows the movement of ideological scores for BJP and INC politicians
respectively calculated using Bayesian Ideal Point estimation. The Before facet shows the pattern
before the election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election whereas the After
facet shows the pattern after election.
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Figure 2.10: Mean ideological polarization over time computed using Bayesian Ideal
Point Estimation.
Before Election After









Notes: ID is the difference between the mean ideological scores of of BJP and INC politicians. The
Before facet shows the pattern before the election, the Election period shows the pattern during
the election whereas the After facet shows the pattern after election.
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Figure 2.11: Trend of negative mentions by parties over time
(a) Trend of negative mentions of BJP politi-
cians by INC politicians
Before Election After











(b) Trend of negative mentions of BJP politi-
cians by INC politicians
Before Election After











Notes: The Before facet shows the pattern before the election, the Election period shows the
pattern during the election whereas the After facet shows the pattern after election.
99
Table 2.1: Number of total seats won by different parties over from 1984- 2019, at
the national level
State Total seats won by BJP Total seats won by BSP Total seats won by CPI Total seats won by CPI(M) Total seats won by INC Total seats won by NCP
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 3 0 0 0 7 0
Andhra Pradesh 15 0 7 4 174 0
Arunachal Pradesh 5 0 0 0 11 0
Assam 29 0 1 2 60 0
Bihar 132 0 17 3 75 1
Chandigarh 4 0 0 0 5 0
Chhattisgarh 40 0 0 0 6 0
Dadar & Nagar Haveli 3 0 0 0 2 0
Daman & Diu 5 0 0 0 3 0
Delhi 43 0 0 0 28 0
Goa 7 0 0 0 9 0
Gujarat 175 0 0 0 79 0
Haryana 28 1 0 0 48 0
Himachal Pradesh 25 0 0 0 17 0
Jammu Kashmir 11 0 0 0 15 0
Jharkhand 32 0 1 0 8 0
Karnataka 109 0 0 0 136 0
Kerala 0 0 9 48 99 0
Lakshwadeep 0 0 0 0 7 2
Madhya Pradesh 227 4 0 0 128 0
Maharashtra 122 0 1 1 205 33
Manipur 1 0 1 0 12 1
Meghalaya 0 0 0 0 15 3
Mizoram 0 0 0 0 5 0
Nagaland 0 0 0 0 5 0
Odisha 32 0 3 2 70 0
Pondicherry 0 0 0 0 7 0
Punjab 13 5 1 0 53 0
Rajasthan 134 0 0 1 106 0
Sikkim 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tamil Nadu 8 0 9 6 109 0
Telangana 5 0 0 0 17 0
Tripura 2 0 1 14 4 0
Uttar Pradesh 350 82 3 1 157 0
Uttarakhand 14 0 0 0 7 0
West Bengal 24 0 25 180 58 0
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Table 2.2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Hashtag Analysis
Panel A: RDD Estimates for Hashtag Similarity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Hashtag10 Hashtag20 Hashtag40 Hashtag50 Hashtag100
1 -1.149* 0.585 2.024 3.179* -0.712
(0.661) (1.013) (1.297) (1.782) (2.955)
2 -1.476* -0.337 0.856 1.930 -0.883
(0.758) (1.308) (1.679) (2.070) (3.364)
3 -1.565* 0.501 1.827 2.771 -1.247
(0.847) ( 1.579) (2.311) (2.519) (3.877)
4 0.052 4.449 1.970 4.206 3.881
(1.346) (3.109) (4.091) (4.413) (7.803)
N 104 104 104 104 104
Panel B: RDD Estimates for Inverse Score std estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Inv Score std10Inv Score std20Inv Score std40Inv Score std50Inv Score std100
1 -80.796 -61.676 -85.921 0.452 -0.134
(60.602) (53.497) (83.394) (1.826) (1.590)
2 -99.342 -100.640 -104.111 0.642 -1.098
(71.024) (74.989) (100.885) (2.781) (2.029)
3 -110.202 -115.865 -113.233 -0.598 -1.000
(78.748) (84.178) (110.437) (3.556) (2.344)
4 -110.112 -110.459 -133.120 -0.656 2.041
(88.487) (91.137) (132.871) (4.105) (2.620)
N 104 104 104 104 104
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hashtag similarity is defined as the number of common hashtags used by BJP and
INC conditional on the top hashtags used by them. Inverse Score std is the inverse
of distance between fraction of negative tweets for the BJP and INC out of all the
tweets that use a similar hashtag standardized for the number of topics. I perform a
non-parametric RDD in Time using a data driven bandwidth selection method. The
estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 2.3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Euclidean distance measures be-
tween topic distributions and word distributions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Degree Hellinger KLDBI KLDIB JDIB JDBLIL
1 -0.032 -0.036 -0.035 -0.067*** -0.071***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.013) (0.017)
2 -0.022 -0.014 -0.014 -0.070*** -0.080***
( 0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.018) (0.022)
3 -0.016 0.002 0.003 -0.090*** -0.091***
(0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.019) (0.024)
4 -0.028 0.002 0.006 -0.049 -0.024
( 0.066) (0.059) (0.055) (0.035) (0.047)
N 104 104 104 104 104
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hellinger Distance and theKLDBI and KLDIB measure the distance between the
topic distributions after implementing the LDA model on the content of the tweets.
The JDIB and JDBLIL measures the distance between the word distributions used
by the Democrats and Republicans in their tweets. I perform a non-parametric RDD
in Time using a data driven bandwidth selection method. The estimates are reported
for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 2.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Euclidean Distance and Euclidean
distance interacted with sentiment for dominant topic












Panel B: RDD Estimates for sentiment augmented Euclidean distance
(1)










[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Score is defined as the euclidean distance between the vectors of fraction of
each topic(dominant topic in each tweet) for the BJP and INC tweets for each
week.Sum Frac Dis is the euclidean distance for each topic between BJP and INC,
after controlling for the sentiment of the topics.Scorestd and Sum Frac Disstd rep-
resents the standardized version of the metrics, where the metric is divided by the
square root of number of topics. I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a
data driven bandwidth selection method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and
4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 2.5: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Bayesian Ideal Point(BIP) Esti-
mates for politicians and Ideological Difference
























[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Footnote 2: In Panel A BJP and INC shows the mean ideological score for all
BJP and INC politicians. In Panel B Ideological Diff difference between mean
BJP and INC ideological scores. I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a
data driven bandwidth selection method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and
4 degrees of polynomials.
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Table 2.6: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Mention Network Analysis
























[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A BJP Negatively are shares of how many times BJP politicians are
mentioned negatively relative to all mentions of BJP politicians by the INC politi-
cians. In Panel B INC Negatively are shares of how many times INC politicians are
mentioned negatively relative to all mentions of INC politicians by the BJP politi-
cians. I perform a non-parametric RDD in Time using a data driven bandwidth
selection method. The estimates are reported for 1, 2, 3 and 4 degrees of polynomi-
als.
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Table 2.7: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Hashtag Analysis














Panel B: Estimates of forInverse Score std estimates
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Inv Score 10std 13.39 0.1503
(10.93) (0.6005)
Inv Score 20std 13.25 -1.0146
(10.07) (0.7933)
Inv Score 40std 17.21 -0.1608
(14.80) (0.8895)
Inv Score 50std 0.3028 -0.2333
(0.3643) (0.1790)
Inv Score 100std 0.2140 0.03625
(0.3302) (0.23343)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hashtag similarity is defined as the number of common hashtags used by BJP and
INC politicians conditional on the top hashtags used by them. Inverse Score std
is the inverse of distance between fraction of negative tweets for the BJP and INC
politicians of all the tweets that use a similar hashtag standardized for the number
of topics. The Before column shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election
whereas the After column shows the estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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KLD BI 0.004240 -0.0000642
(0.008231) (0.0037969)
KLD IB 0.004188 0.0003346
(0.008208) (0.0038722)
JD BI 0.004078 0.006455**
(0.002211) (0.002562)
JD BLIL 0.003652 0.005875**
(0.001990) (0.002019)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] Hellinger Distance and theKLDBI and KLDIB measure the distance between the
topic distributions after implementing the LDA model on the content of the tweets.
The JDBI and JDBLIL measures the distance between the word distributions used by
the BJP and INC politicians in their tweets. The Before column shows the estimates
for 8 weeks before the election whereas the After column shows the estimates for 8
weeks after the election.
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Table 2.9: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Euclidean Distance and Euclidean distance
interacted with sentiment for dominant topic








Panel B: Estimates for sentiment augmented Euclidean distance
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
Sum Frac Dis -0.007249 0.007772
(0.043724) (0.114610)
Sum Frac Disstd -0.008339 0.000714
(0.015973) (0.032930)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2]Score is defined as the euclidean distance between the vectors of fraction of each
topic(dominant topic in each tweet) for the BJP and INC politicians tweets for each
week. Sum Frac Dis is the euclidean distance for each topic between Republicans
and Democrats after controlling for the sentiment of the topics. The Before column
shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas the After column shows
the estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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Table 2.10: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Bayesian Ideal Point(BIP) Estimates for
politicians and Ideological Difference in competitive and non-competitive districts














[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A BJP and INC shows the mean ideological score for all BJP and INC
politicians respectively. In Panel B ID and shows the difference between mean BJP
and INC politicians’ ideological scores. The Before column shows the estimates for 8
weeks before the election whereas the After column shows the estimates for 8 weeks
after the election.
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Table 2.11: OLS Sub-sample Estimates for Mention Network Analysis
Panel A: Estimates for Mentions by INC
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
BJP Negatively -0.03842 0.05171
(0.03489) (0.03195)
N 8 8
Panel B: Estimates of mentions by Republicans
(1) (2)
Metric Before After
INC Negatively -0.02223 0.00169
(0.01200) (0.02322)
N 8 8
[1] Standard error in parentheses. * denotes 10 percent significance, ** denotes 5
percent significance and *** denotes 1 percent significance.
[2] In Panel A BJP Negatively are shares of how many times BJP politicians are
mentioned negatively relative to all mentions of BJP politicians by the INC politi-
cians. In Panel B INC Negatively are shares of how many times INC politicians
are mentioned negatively relative to all mentions of INC politicians by the BJP politi-
cians. The Before column shows the estimates for 8 weeks before the election whereas
the After column shows the estimates for 8 weeks after the election.
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Chapter 3
The effect of political business
cycles on government expenditure
and night light in India (with
Sagnik Das)
3.1 Introduction
Incumbent politicians are believed to manipulate voters close to an election to
maximize their chances of getting re-elected. This leads to political business cycles,
wherein politicians stimulate the economy close to the election. In this chapter, we
investigate if there is evidence of political business cycles in the Indian context. We
investigate if government expenditure increases close to the election.
We use labour expenditure for employing manual labourers, employment provided
to labourers, new road constructed data as measures of government expenditure and
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night light data at the yearly level as proxy for electricity provision as well as some
other government expenditure induced development. We also use high-frequency
night light data at the monthly level to check for political business cycles over the
short run. We find the relationship between these variables and the proximity to
an election to investigate the existence of political business cycles after controlling
for economic, demographic and other election-related controls along with spatial and
temporal fixed effects.
To get the data on elections, we focus on state-level legislative assembly elections
for different states of Indian held broadly within the period 1993-2018 with slight
adjustments as per the period of availability of the outcome variable. Our outcome
variables, however, are not at the assembly constituency level but the district level.
Since a district comprises many assembly constituencies, the election data are ag-
gregated at the district level. States comprise districts, and all constituencies in a
state have elections in the same year. Hence, it would be possible to conduct the
analysis at the state level too. However, there is considerable heterogeneity among
the districts within a state and between districts belonging to different states. To
capture this heterogeneity across districts, we keep our analysis at the district level.
Since political competition among the contesting political parties participating in the
election might be the underlying reason that gives rise to political business cycles, we
control for political competition in each district by computing the difference in the
share of the number of legislative assembly constituencies that the electorally most
successful and the second most successful political party won in a district for each
election cycle.
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Our results indicate the existence of political business cycles for variables measuring
labour expenditure made by the government and employment provided at the inten-
sive margin. We also find evidence of political business cycles impacting the length
of new road constructed and the cost sanctioned for new roads to be constructed.
We find some evidence of political business cycles existing for night light data at
the yearly level. However, we do not find a conclusive trend for the high-frequency
analysis at the monthly level, even though we find a spike in night light intensity one
month before the election. There is no evidence of gaming the electrification process
close to the election.
The theory of political business cycles was first proposed by Nordhaus (1975) and
Lindbeck (1976). While these theories focus on myopic voters who focus on outcomes
close to the election to decide whom they are going to vote for, there is another strand
of literature developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Marin et al. (1990) suggesting
that stimulating the economy close to the election might provide a signal to voters
about the ability of politicians to influence future policies. Whether one believes that
voters are myopic or forward-looking, the theory suggests that politicians would be
inclined to increase economic activity close to elections to gain electoral advantage.
The theory of political business cycles has been primarily tested in developed
and industrialized nations for macroeconomic policies, and the evidence has been
mixed. Berger and Woitek (1997) find evidence of political business cycles in Ger-
many whereas McCallum (1978), and Klein (1993) reject the hypothesis that macroe-
conomic outcomes are influenced by the political business cycles. The evidence from
developing nations in more micro-founded economic outcomes over which local politi-
cians have more significant control is increasing over time. Gonzalez (2002) shows
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that the Mexican government uses public spending to secure votes. In the Indian
context, Cole (2009) shows that public banks in India track the electoral cycle with
agricultural credit growing up by 5 to 10 percent in the election year. Baskaran et al.
(2015) shows that electricity provision as proxied by night lights fluctuates in accor-
dance with electoral cycles; however, they only focus on by-elections in their paper
where a special election is held upon the death of an incumbent politician.
Our chapter extends the political business cycle literature and makes three signifi-
cant contributions. First, we exploit a host of developmental outcome variables with
spatial and temporal variations across districts in India to study the impact of po-
litical business cycles. Our second contribution is that we look at new roads created
data and the employment data from the NREGA programme, which has not been
used in the political business cycle literature previously and which helps us under-
stand whether the creation of infrastructural goods as well as employment outcomes
are also influenced by political business cycles. Thirdly, we also look at short-run
fluctuations in high-frequency night light data and investigate if they are influenced
by election cycles.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the Institu-
tional Background and Section 3.3 introduces the Data. Section 3.4 discusses the
Empirical Strategy, Section 3.5 discusses the Results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
India is a Unitary Federation divided into 29 states (which comprise almost
the entire area and population) and seven union territories. All 29 states and 2
Union Territories (the National Capital Territory of Delhi and Puducherry) have
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a parliamentary form of provincial government. There is a parliamentary form of
government at the Centre, known as the central government for the entire country
and also at the State level. The Constitution of India vests significant executive
power to state governments, whose combined expenditure outstrips that of the central
government.
3.2.1 Geographical hierarchy of India according to the ECI
India’s hierarchical structure is three-tiered, as implemented by the Election
Commission of India (the non-political central body responsible for conducting elec-
tions in India). The Central Government, known as the Lok Sabha, is at the top of
the tier. The Lok Sabha has 552 members, out of which 530 members representing
the different states and 20 members representing the different union territories are
elected through the Lok Sabha elections conducted every five years. The party or the
coalition that secures the majority of votes forms the executive branch comprising
the Prime Minister (P.M.), the Cabinet and the Council of Ministers. 2 members of
parliament are assigned through the President’s (the nominal head of the country)
recommendation. The Lok Sabha is mainly concerned with undertaking national-level
policies as defined in the Union List and Concurrent List, which mainly comprises
defence, foreign affairs, railways, banking, education and others. On the second tier
of the three-tier system lies the state legislative assemblies, also known as the Vidhan
Sabhas. Each state is divided into single-member Legislative Assembly constituen-
cies for which elections are held with the winner decided by a first-past-the-post
(FPTP) system. Elections are held regularly at five-year intervals (elections can be
held before the end of a five-year term if no party or coalition can continue with
a majority). Elections are conducted by the Election Commission of India, a con-
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stitutionally established independent body. The party or coalition that secures the
majority of Legislative Constituency seats forms the executive branch comprising the
Chief Minister of the state, the Cabinet, and the Council of Ministers. The electorate
votes partly based on the ruling political party and its chief ministerial candidate
and partly based on the legislative constituency candidate (as state election survey
results in Lokniti-CSDS [2014b] show. However, the former’s importance is generally
higher than that of the latter; the importance attached to the legislative constituency
candidate can be over 30 percent, as in the 2018 Karnataka Legislative Assembly
election).
The number of Assembly Constituencies into which a state is divided varies markedly
across states: the most populated state, Uttar Pradesh, has 403 assembly constituen-
cies while Puducherry has only 30. Among the more populated states, the number
of legislative constituencies is roughly proportional to the state’s total population
according to the 1971 census. For states with lower populations, the population-
constituency ratio is higher.
At the last tier of the three-tier political and administrative system is a local
government system called the Panchayat (Rural Local Bodies) and Municipalities
(Urban Local Bodies). The Panchayat or Municipalities is a local government system
comprising elected members through panchayat/municipal elections, conducted every
five years. The panchayat system is three-tiered, with the village council at the very
bottom, followed by the block council and the district council at the very top.
Although the central government and the state government function independently,
when it comes to providing public goods or implementing specific policies decided
upon by both the state government and the central government, many decisions are
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taken at the constituency level. Argued by Lehne et al. (2018), even though the
members of the legislative assembly do not have a direct influence on the process
of provision of public goods sanctioned by the central government, the members of
the legislative assembly enjoy substantial political power to have an influence on the
implementation of a policy or the provision of public goods at the local level. Also,
the members of a legislative assembly constituency have direct access to the Chief
Minister’s office, which is the state’s highest administrative office. Thus, the leg-
islative assembly member has the potential to inform the ministers and the Chief
Minister of the state about the developmental needs of his/her constituency leading
to influence infrastructural or any other socio-economic changes in the constituency.
Keeping in mind this potential of the legislative assembly members to influence gov-
ernment expenditure in the assembly constituencies, in this chapter, we investigate
if the influence is large enough to bring about significant changes in their localities,
resulting in political business cycles.
3.2.2 Geographical hierarchy of India according to the Cen-
sus
The Census of India divides India’s geographical boundary into States, and
within those states are districts, which are further divided into blocks and then into
towns and villages. A district also constitutes several legislative assembly constituen-
cies. The population census is conducted by the Government of India every ten years.
Since Indian independence, there have been many changes in these boundaries, men-
tioned in the different census reports across the years. New states have come into
being within our period of study, and also, the geographical boundaries of districts
have been redrawn multiple times. Since our study period overlaps across three differ-
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ent population census periods (1991, 2001 and 2011), to avoid any potential overlaps
in boundaries across different census periods, we have considered districts’ geograph-
ical boundaries as drawn in the 2011 population census in our analysis. The outcome
variables used in the chapter are compatible with the population census 2011 delim-
itation of district boundaries.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Outcome Variables
For our outcome variables, we use three data sources - employment data from
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), new road
constructed data from Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) and night
lights data both at the yearly level and at the monthly level (for the high-frequency
night light analysis). Our outcome variables are at the village level, and we aggregate
them to the district using a district identifier as per the 2011 delimitation reports of
population Census1.
3.3.1.1 First Outcome Variable: Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Em-
ployment Guarantee Act
For our first outcome variable, we use data from one of the most extensive
employment guarantee programmes in the world implemented in India. This em-
ployment guarantee programme started in 2006 with the enforcement of the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in 200 of India’s most backward dis-
tricts, Ambasta et al. (2008). It was then extended to all of rural India from April 1,
1The high-frequency night light data and the NREGA data is already at the district level and
hence we do not need to aggregate it
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2008. This is a unique act because it legally binds the government to provide work
to rural labourers who want to work at that wage, and the government cannot be
excused due to a lack of resources. In this scheme, the government is liable to provide
100 days of employment to every rural household whose adult members volunteer to
participate in unskilled manual labour. The employment seeker has to register him-
self/herself through the Gram Panchayat and is given a job card. The employment
begins within 15 days of the issuance of a job card. If the government cannot provide
employment within those 15 days, they need to pay the labourers’ unemployment
benefits. Some other salient features of the scheme are that one-third of the benefi-
ciaries need to be women. Some form of employment-related fundamental rights such
as access to drinking water, restroom, creches for kids, emergency health care need to
be ascertained. The scheme also needs to be socially audited, but the audit process
has come under criticism for not being efficient and effective.
The scheme is implemented at the national, state, district and village level, and all
the tiers have their specific role to play. Although the funding decisions are mostly
made at the Central level, and the planning and administration decisions are made
at the State level, the actual issuance of job cards after proper scrutiny and allotting
of jobs happen at the Gram Panchayat level.
We have the NREGA data available from 2011 to 2020. Using the NREGA dataset,
we construct a host of outcome variables. The total number of households who
demanded jobs, the share of households (HH) who received the job card out of all
job card applicants, the share of households who were allotted jobs out of all those
households who demanded jobs, the share of households who went onto to complete
100 days of work conditional upon receiving allotted jobs, and finally, the labour
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expenditure by the government. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the
variables. Table 3.2 shows these variables’ values from four years before the election
to the election year. We see some variation in the demand for jobs, although they
do not show any particular trend. We can see that for the share of applicants who
received job cards and the share of applicants who were allotted work, there is no
change in the values over the years because these are determined by bureaucratic
processes which are well defined. There is not much scope for political interference.
We see considerable variation in the labour expenditure over the years, and the value
mostly keeps increasing from four years before the election to the election year. The
share of applicants who completed 100 days of employment also keeps increasing from
four years before the election to one year before the election but drops in the election
year. For each of the variables mentioned, we also compute the yearly change in each
variable compared to the previous year. Figures 3.1, 3.2a and 3.2b show the spatial
and temporal variation for the total number of households who demanded job, share of
households who were allocated job cards and subsequently allotted jobs. There is some
spatial and temporal variation in the total number of households who demanded work.
However, we see minimal spatial and temporal variation in the share of households
with issued job cards and the share of households with allotted jobs. There is minimal
variation in these variables, given that they are not heavily influenced by elections
and are determined by purely manual bureaucratic procedures. Figures 3.3a and
3.3b shows the spatial and temporal variation in the labor expenditure and share of
households who completed 100 days of unemployment. We see substantial variation
both across districts and distance to an election in these two variables.
120
3.3.1.2 Second outcome variable : Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana
In 2000, India launched the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (Prime Min-
ister’s Village Road Program, or PMGSY). This national programme aimed to build
a paved road to every village in India eventually. While the federal government is-
sued implementation guidelines, decisions on village-level allocations of roads were
ultimately made at the district level. The unit of targeting road construction was the
habitation, the smallest rural administrative unit in India. A village typically com-
prises between one and three habitations; there are approximately 600,000 villages in
India and 1.5 million habitations. In some states, this took the form of a strict popu-
lation threshold for road construction eligibility, while other states used other criteria.
Given the programme rules, early-treated villages tended to have larger populations
but were not substantially different from late-treated villages in other characteris-
tics. There were initially 80,000 villages eligible for the road construction program,
which has grown as guidelines have been expanded to include smaller villages. By
2015, over 115,000 villages had paved roads built or upgraded under the PMGSY pro-
gram. These construction projects were most often managed through subcontracts
with larger firms and were built with capital-intensive methods and external labour.
The PMGSY data is available from 2000 to 2014.
From the SHRUG ancillary data used previously in Asher and Novosad (2020), we
use the information on the length of new road constructed and the costs sanctioned for
new road to be constructed in each district in each year over our period of study and
use those as our outcome variables. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the
new road constructed data and the cost sanctioned for new road to be constructed.
We also compute the change in the variables. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics
for the same outcome variables based on distance to election. We see that for the
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length of new road constructed increases from four years before the election to two
years before the election and then decreases in the year before the election and the
election year. The variable on cost sanctioned for road to be constructed increases
in value from four years before election to the year before the election and then falls
in the election year. Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b show the spatial and temporal
heterogeneity. While we find some spatial heterogeneity across states, the temporal
variation seems to be limited to certain states only.
3.3.1.3 Third Outcome Variable : Night Light Data
For the third outcome, we use the night lights data from the SHRUG data set
used previously in Asher et al. (2020). Night lights are a proxy for economic growth
that has the advantage of high resolution and objective measurement over 20+ years
(Henderson, Storeygard and Weill 2011). Night light data has been used in various
papers in India because of the absence of official data on electrification or economic
performance at regular intervals, especially for rural areas. Dugoua et al. (2018) use
night light data to measure electrification in rural areas in India, Asher and Novosad
(2017) use night light data to measure economic output in India.
As a measure of the intensity of night-light data, we use the district mean of
calibrated night-light intensity. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the night
light data. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for night light data based on
distance to election. The value of mean calibrated night light intensity increases from
four years before the election to the election, although modestly. We also compute the
changes in these variables. Figure 3.6 shows that we have significant heterogeneity in
the spatial dimension, but not so much in the temporal dimension. Our yearly night
light data range from 1994 to 2014.
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To check for whether there is a more short-run effect of an election, we look at high-
frequency night light data available at the monthly level. We use the India Lights
platform, a repository of light output at night for 20 years for 600,000 villages across
India2.
Variables in the high frequency night light dataset The variables that we have
in the dataset include the year and the month in which the measurement was taken,
the name of the district and the state corresponding to that particular measurement,
the satellite used to make the observation, the number of measurements in that month
and the median night light intensity in that month in that year in that district3. Table
3.3 and Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics for the median night light intensity
and the standardized median night light intensity respectively. As we can see, there
is not much variation in the mean of the median night light intensity at various
points in time. Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 shows the spatial and temporal variation
in the median night light intensity and the standardized median night light intensity
respectively. We can again see that the spatial component variation is more than the
2The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) has taken pictures of the Earth every
night from 1993 to 2018. In collaboration with the World Bank, researchers at the University of
Michigan used the DMSP images to extract the data on Indian night lights.
3The DMSP raster images have a resolution of 30 arc-seconds, equal to roughly 1 square kilometre
at the equator. For each raster image, a pixel of the image is assigned a number based on a relative
scale which ranges from 0 to 63. The number 0 indicates no light output, while 63 indicates the high-
est level of output. This assigned number is relative and might change depending on the satellite’s
sensor’s gain settings, which constantly adjust to current conditions as it takes pictures throughout
the day and at night. To derive a single measurement, the light output values are extracted from
the raster image for each date for the pixels that correspond to each village’s approximate latitude
and longitude coordinates. Then the data is processed through a series of filtering and aggregation
procedures. After extracting the data from the pixels, in the first step, according to recommen-
dations from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), data with too much
cloud cover and solar glare is filtered out. Then, the resulting 4.4 billion data points are aggregated
by taking the median measurement for each village over a month, adjusting for differences among
satellites using multiple regression on year and satellite to isolate each satellite’s effect. The me-
dian village light output within each administrative boundary for each month in the twenty years is
determined for analysing the data at the district or state level. These monthly aggregates for each
village, district, and state have been made accessible through the API.
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variation in the temporal component. The monthly night light data set is available
for the years 1993 to 2013.
3.3.2 Independent Variables
The independent/control variables include election-related variables, demo-
graphic and economic characteristics. The election-related variables have been con-
structed from the Trivedi election dataset for assembly constituency elections span-
ning 1989-2018 in the data repository of Lok Dhaba Election Data of Ashoka Uni-
versity. It is a dummy variable indicating how far is the election in a district from
the year in which the outcome variable is measured. For example, the district of
Bardhaman in West Bengal, a state in India, had its election in 1991 and 1996. We
consider the election year of 1996 to be our baseline. Any outcome variable measured
in 1995 is considered to be one year away from the election and is assigned a dummy.
This is done for all the years in between till we reach the preceding election year of
1991, and the process is repeated. The distance to the election is our primary vari-
able of interest. The dataset on election results reports other election details for each
constituency in each district in each state for each election cycle. Since our level of
analysis is at the district level, we aggregate the constituency-level variables like the
share of seats in a district won by the most and the second most electorally successful
party in a district for each election cycle and then take their difference. We use this
as a control variable as a proxy for the district’s electoral competitiveness. We also
use the information on the majority party to be able to control for party fixed effects.
For the demographic variables, we have used the Population Census of 1991, 2001
and 2011. Using the variables reported at the district level for each of the censuses,
we have controlled for population and some essential demographic variables such as
124
sex-ratio, share of the literate population out of total population, share of literate
population who completed primary schooling, share of literate population who com-
pleted secondary schooling and share of literate population who completed higher
secondary schooling.
We use rural and urban employment figures provided by the Reserve Bank of India
for the economic variables. For the analysis using the NREGA dataset, we also use
the State Gross Domestic Product (SGDP) as a control variable. We cannot use
SGDP for the other datasets because we do not have SGDP data for those periods.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Analysis based on years to election
Our study’s objective is to investigate the existence of a causal relationship
between the proximity to the next election in a district and government expenditure
in that particular district. In other words, we want to quantify the effect an upcoming
election has on the government expenditure in the area through the actions of the
elected representatives who want to maximize their probability of winning.
Ideally, our unit of analysis should be an assembly constituency because the ju-
risdiction of an elected representative’s power is at the assembly constituency level.
However, due to the non-availability of data, we have to aggregate the assembly con-
stituency level electoral variables at the district level to match the spatial coarseness
of the outcome variables as done in Clots-Figueras (2012).
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We perform the analysis at the district using the following empirical strategy.
ydst = θd + βt +
−1∑
i=−4
γi× TOEist + partydst + α× SSdst +Demdt +Ecost + udst (3.1)
where ydst represents the outcome variable for a district d in state s in year t, θd
represents district fixed effect, βt represents the time fixed effect, TOEst are dum-
mies indicating years to election in state s at time t, the election year is treated as
the baseline and γi is our variable of interest. partydst shows the electorally most
successful party in district for each election cycle d, state s and time t and accounts
for party fixed effect. SSdst represents the seat share difference of the most and the
second most electorally successful party in the district. Demdt and Ecost are the
demographic and economic controls at the district and the state level respectively.
3.4.2 Analysis based on high frequency night light data and
months to election
To check if there is any effect of proximity of election on the short run night
light intensity, we investigate the effect of the closeness of election on high-frequency
night light intensity measured monthly. We merge each monthly observation of night
light data to the election that happened before if the past election happened 30
months ago or two and a half years ago, and to the upcoming election if the next
election is less than or equal to 30 months away or two and a half years away from the
current month. We then drop the duplicate observations without loss of generality.
After we have the clean dataset, we create twenty-five dummies, 12 for each month
upto one year before the election, one for the election month, and 12 dummies for
each month upto one year after election. All other months are considered to be
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the baseline category. We also use district-month fixed effect to account for the
seasonality in night light data in different districts and control for year fixed effect,
along with all the other economic and demographic controls, seat share difference and
party fixed effect. Our object of interest is to find what happens to night light as we
move towards the election and what happens as we move away from it.






where ydmst is the night light in district d, in state s, in month m of year t,
MTEismt is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when the observation in state s in
year t in month m is i months away from election. For example MTE−1smt is equal to
1 when the observation is one month before the election. θd×ωm is the district times
month fixed effect, βt is the time fixed effect, partydst is the party fixed effect, SSdst
is the difference in seat share between the majority and the second majority party,
Demdt are the demographic controls and Ecost are the economic controls.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Results for analysis based on years to election
In this section, we describe and interpret the regression equation results men-
tioned in the Empirical Strategy section for the yearly analysis, involving the various
outcome variables mentioned in the Data section.
All the coefficient estimates of the primary explanatory variable in the chapter,
Time to an election, viz. the distance from a state assembly election in years, are to
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be interpreted compared to the baseline category viz. year of the election.
3.5.1.1 Outcome variable:Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme data
Table 3.5 shows the regression results when the outcome variable is the amount
of money in 100,000 rupees spent by the government on labour expenditure. As
referred to by the column names of the table, all the different model specifications
indicate a trend in the effect of the proximity to election captured by the explanatory
variable TOEst. For the main model specification, represented in column (4), as we
move closer to the election, the regression coefficient on TOEst increases, indicating
that, as we move closer to the election year, compared to the baseline year, even
though the money spent on labour expenditure is less, it still shows a steady increase.
As indicated by the regression coefficients, the coefficient for four, three and two years
are statistically significant, but not for one year to election. However, the coefficients
indicate a pattern, with the coefficient being 5.5 million rupees more than that in the
election year for one year before the election and almost 74 million rupees less than
that in the year of election for four years before the election. Also, the coefficient
for the variable difference in seat share, which is a variable capturing the potential
electoral competitiveness in a district, is negative and statistically significant. This
implies that the higher the difference in the seat share between the most successful
and the second most successful political party in a district in a particular election
cycle, the less is the money disbursed by the government for labour expenditure in
that district. This means that the less competitive the district is electorally, the lower
is the money disbursed by the government for labour expenditure. Figure 3.9a plots
the coefficient of TOEst, and it is clear that there is an upward trend in the coefficient
as the proximity to the election increases. This result suggests an effect of the political
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business cycle on money disbursed by the government for labour expenditure. We
also computed the year-wise change in the money disbursed by the government for
labour expenditure and then regressed it on TOEst and other control variables. In
the appendix, Table C.1 reports the results of this regression. We do not find any
statistically significant effect there.
An increase in the labour expenditure can be caused by either an increase in the
demand for NREGA jobs or an increase in the supply of jobs. A possible explanation
for an increase in demand for jobs caused by the proximity to the election could
be that, as an election approaches, the electorate expects that it would be possible
to get more jobs by demanding more jobs from the local administration by using
the promise of votes in exchange for NREGA jobs. If this mechanism exists, this
effect will show up if we regress the number of households who demanded jobs on
our main explanatory variable. Table 3.6 reports the regression result when the
logarithm of the total number of households who demand work is regressed on TOEst
and other control variables. From column (4) of the table, it is observed that there
is no statistically significant effect of the proximity to an election on the number of
households demanding jobs. We also regress the logarithm of the change in the total
number of households who demanded jobs on TOEst and other control variables. The
results are reported in Table C.2. We do not find a statistically significant effect or
even trend following the proximity to an election.
To explore supply-side effects, we investigate if the share of job cards issued and
the share of households allotted work have gone up to see if the main driver of the
increase in labour expenditure is more work offered at the extensive margin. We
regress the share of households who were issued job cards and the share of households
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who were allotted jobs to the number of households who demanded jobs on TOEst,
our primary variable of interest and other control variables. Since a job card being
issued or a household being allotted work are bureaucratic processes, we should not
expect to see these variables be affected by proximity to the election. Table 3.7 shows
the regression result for the share of households issued job cards, and Table 3.8 shows
the regression result for the share of households who were allotted jobs. From both
the tables, it can be concluded that there is not much meaningful effect of proximity
to the election. Therefore, it seems that the increase in labour expenditure are not
driven by jobs on the extensive margin, which we were not expecting in the first
place as these processes are generally immune to political influence. In the appendix,
Table C.3 and Table C.4 reports the regression results when the change in the ratio
of the number of households who were issued job cards to the number of households
who demanded job and the change in the ratio of the number of households who
were allotted jobs to the number of households who demanded jobs are regressed on
TOEst and other control variables. We do not find any statistically significant effect
of TOEst on either of the two outcome variables mentioned.
To check if the increase in money disbursed by the government for labour expen-
diture with an increase in proximity to the election can be explained by the increase
in the supply of jobs at the intensive margin, we regress the number of households
who completed 100 days of work conditional on the fact that these households were
already allotted jobs. Table 3.9 reports the results of this regression. With reference
to our main model specification results as shown in column (4) of the table, there is a
statistically significant spike in the number of households completing 100 days of work
conditional on the number of households who were allotted work, as the proximity
to the election increases. Although the coefficient one year before the election is less
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than that two years before the election, there is a trend from four years before to
one year before the election. Figure 3.9b shows this increasing trend in the political
business cycle coefficient as it gets closer to the election year.
The results discussed above corroborate our theory that there is evidence of the
political business cycle affecting work provided to the labourers. It also indicates
that the possible mechanism through which developmental works might be affected
by the political business cycle is through the proactive measures taken by the political
parties who influence the functioning of the NREGA scheme at the local level.
3.5.1.2 Outcome variable: PMGSY data
Table 3.10 reports the regression results when the total district sum of the
length of new road constructed under the PMGSY scheme is regressed on TOEst and
other controls. According to the main model specification shown in column (4) of
the table, we see a consistent, statistically significant increase in the length of new
road constructed under the PMGSY scheme with the increase in the proximity to the
election. Compared to the election year, the year before the election reports that the
length of the new road constructed under PMGSY was around 33 kilometre more.
Figure 3.12a shows a clear upward trend in the regression coefficients of proximity to
the election. The same regression for the change in total district sum of the length of
the new road constructed under the PMGSY scheme is reported by Table C.6 in the
Appendix. We do not find any statistically significant effect of the political business
cycle on the change in total district sum of the length of new road constructed under
the PMGSY scheme.
Table 3.11 reports the regression results when the total district sum of costs
sanctioned for new road to be constructed under the PMGSY scheme is regressed
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on TOEst and other controls. Like the total district sum of the new road’s length,
this variable also shows a steady increase compared to the baseline, as the proximity
to the election increases. The coefficient is highest for one year before the election,
as reported by column (4) of the table. According to column (4), compared to the
year of the election, the previous year experiences more than 120 million rupees
more sanctioned for the construction of new road. Figure 3.12b shows the steady
increase in the coefficients as the proximity to the election increases, thus reflecting
the impact of the political business cycle on cost sanctioned for road constructed
under the PMGSY scheme. Cost sanctioned for new road constructed increases by a
lot from 63 million rupees to 111 million rupees from three years before the election
to two years before the election. This probably happens because the output of such
sanctions in terms of new road constructed will be visible close to the election. Also,
cost sanctioned is the highest just before the election year. The politicians probably
use the announcements of cost sanctioned to lure voters for voting and also as a signal
that the projects will be implemented if they are elected to power. Table C.7 in the
appendix reports the results for the same regression, with the outcome variable being
change in total district sum of costs sanctioned for new road to be constructed under
the PMGSY scheme. Again, we do not find any statistically significant effect of the
political business cycle on change in total district sum of costs sanctioned for new
roads to be constructed under the PMGSY scheme.
3.5.1.3 Outcome variable: Night-light data
Table 3.12 reports the regression results when district mean of calibrated night-
light intensity is regressed on TOEst and other controls
4. Column (4) of the table
4This table provides the results after we exclude the outliers. The results which include outliers
(mainly big cities) are included in the Appendix.)
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reports the regression coefficients for the main model specification. The results suggest
that compared to the baseline year, as election approaches, the mean calibrated night
light intensity increases gradually, from the coefficient going from being negative for
four years before the election to being positive for one year before the election. The
coefficient for four years before the election on column (4) is reported as -1.148, and
for one year before the election, it is reported as 0.434. This means that for four years
before the election, the mean calibrated night light intensity is 1.148 units less than
the mean calibrated night light intensity for the year of election. Whereas for one year
before the election, the mean calibrated night light intensity is 0.434 units greater than
the election year. Both of these coefficients are statistically significant. Although the
coefficients for the 2 and 3 years to the election are not statistically significant, they
do show an upward pattern as the proximity to the election increases. Figure 3.13
just corroborates this fact visually. So, we see that political business cycles positively
impact a proxy measure for economic development. Table C.8 in the appendix reports
the results for this same regression, only the outcome variable being the change in
calibrated mean night light intensity. Although we find the coefficient for one year
before the election to be positive and statistically significant, any particular pattern
is missing. So it is difficult to draw causal conclusions.
3.5.2 Results for analysis based on high frequency night light
data and months to election
Table 3.13 and Table 3.14 shows the estimates for the different model specifica-
tions for Equation 3.2 for the median night light intensity and standardized median
night light intensity as outcome variables respectively. Col 4 in Table 3.13 shows
our most desired specification with the district times month fixed effects, year fixed
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effects, party fixed effects, demographic and economic controls and seat share differ-
ence. We find that the coefficient of MTEismt increases from 3 months before the
election to the election month, although only the coefficient one month before the
election is statistically significant. The coefficient also decreases very sharply after
the election, but the estimate is not significant. Therefore, although we find some
evidence of night light intensity increasing just before the election, being positive in
the election month and becoming negative in the month after election, we do not
find any conclusive evidence for identifying a trend in the high-frequency night light
data. Table 3.14 shows the coefficients when the median night light intensity is stan-
dardized to appreciate the magnitude of the coefficients better. The coefficients are
very small, even when they are significant. Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 shows the
coefficient estimates visually for Col 4 in Table 3.13 and Table 3.14 respectively. As
seen in the figures, median night light intensity increases from two months before
the election to the election month and then drops sharply afterwards, although the
coefficients are really small.
To investigate the credibility of the high-frequency night light data, we aggregate
the night light data and regress them on some of our demographic and economic
variables, which are expected to correlate with night light positively. Table 3.15 shows
the existence of a statistically significant positive correlation between median night
light intensity and sex ratio, share of the population who completed secondary school
and share of the population who completed high school (HS). Since these indicators
of development and night light are a proxy of economic development, these significant
correlations do bolster our belief in the outcome variable’s credibility. The median
night light intensity also negatively correlates with rural unemployment, making the
outcome variable more legitimate. However, the outcome variable does not show a
134
significant correlation with the population or with the share of the literate population,
although the coefficients are positive as expected. The correlation coefficient with the
share of the population who completed primary education is statistically significant
and negative, but this probably makes sense since our education measures are not
cumulative and completing only primary education might signify that students are
dropping out before secondary school and hence can be interpreted as a measure of
underdevelopment. The correlation with urban unemployment, however, is positive
and significant, which is surprising. However, we can believe the high-frequency
estimates are a good proxy for economic development given all the other evidence.
Having made a case for the credibility of the high-frequency night light estimates,
we can argue with a greater degree of confidence that although politicians do seem to
respond to the anticipation of an upcoming election just before the election, the effects
are minimal and do not point towards a conclusive trend. Therefore, we conclude that
there is not much of a political business cycle in the short run with respect to the
night light and no evidence of very short-run gaming of electricity production.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we collect data on employment provided to labourers, road
constructed, and night light intensity to investigate the effects of political business
cycles on government expenditure. Although the first two data sources can be con-
sidered direct governmental expenditure, night lights can be considered a proxy for
government expenditure. We find that the government’s labour expenditure on man-
dated employment provided to labourers increases, and so does the number of people
who get 100 days of employment conditional on being allotted a job as one gets closer
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to the election. We also find evidence of a political business cycle in new road con-
structed and cost sanctioned for road to be constructed, along with evidence of the
political business cycle in night light intensity. Our results, therefore, provide sub-
stantial evidence of the existence of political business cycles in the micro-economic
governmental expenditure in a developing country.
We also do a short analysis on a high-frequency night light data at the monthly level
to investigate short-run effects of the proximity to the election. Although we do find
night light intensity to have a positive coefficient just the month before the election
(statistically significantly) and a positive coefficient in the month of election and a
negative coefficient the month after the election, and therefore find some evidence of
politicians responding to the anticipation of the election, we are unable to find any
conclusive trend in the high-frequency analysis.
In further extensions of our work, we would want to look into some other outcomes
such as different types of crimes committed, some health and education outcomes
such as money allocated to government hospitals and schools, and investigate if the
proximity to the election also influences them.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Temporal and spatial variation in total number of HH who demanded
work
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Figure 3.2: Temporal and spatial variation in share of Household we were allotted
job cards and were allotted jobs
(a) Share of households who got job cards
(b) Share of households who were allotted
work
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Figure 3.3: Temporal and spatial variation in labor expenditure by government and
share of households who completed 100 days of employment
(a) Labor expenditure by government
(b) Share of households who completed 100
days of employment
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Figure 3.4: Temporal and spatial variation in new road constructed and sanctioned
cost of new road
(a) Length of new road constructed (b) Coast sanctioned for new road
Figure 3.5: Temporal and spatial variation in mean calibrated night light intensity
Figure 3.6
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Figure 3.7: Temporal and spatial variation in high frequency median calibrated night
light intensity
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Figure 3.8: Temporal and spatial variation in standardized high frequency median
calibrated night light intensity
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Figure 3.9: Dot Whisker Plots for coefficient estimates of labor expenditure and share
of HH who completed 100 days of employment
(a) Labor expenditure disbursed by
government
(b) Share of HH who completed 100
days of employment
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the years to election. The
orange dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran only with the district and year
fixed effects, while the blue dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran with the fixed
effects and other demographic and economic controls.
Figure 3.10: Logarithm of HH who demanded work under NREGA
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the years to election. The
orange dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran only with the district and year
fixed effects, while the blue dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran with the fixed
effects and other demographic and economic controls.
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Figure 3.11: Dot Whisker Plots for coefficient estimates of share of households who
were issued job cards and allotted work
(a) Share of households who got job
cards
(b) Share of households who were al-
lotted work
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the years to election. The
orange dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran only with the district and year
fixed effects, while the blue dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran with the fixed
effects and other demographic and economic controls.
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Figure 3.12: Dot Whisker Plots for coefficient estimates of new road constructed and
sanctioned cost of new road
(a) Length of new road constructed (b) Cost sanctioned for new road
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the years to election. The
orange dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran only with the district and year
fixed effects, while the blue dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran with the fixed
effects and other demographic and economic controls.
Figure 3.13: Dot Whisker Plots for coefficient estimates of mean calibrated night light
intensity
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the years to election. The
orange dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran only with the district and year
fixed effects, while the blue dot represents the coefficient when the regression is ran with the fixed
effects and other demographic and economic controls.
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Figure 3.14: Regression coefficient plot when high frequency night light intensity is
regressed on months to election.
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the months to election and
demographic and economic controls, district fixed effect, (district × month fixed effect) and year
fixed effects.
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Figure 3.15: Regression coefficient plot when standardized high frequency night light
intensity is regressed on months to election.
Notes: Each dot in the figure is a plot of the regression coefficient of the months to election and
demographic and economic controls, district fixed effect, (district × month fixed effect) and year
fixed effects.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for outcome and control variables
Statistic Mean St. Dev.
Outcome variables
Labor expenditure disbursed by Government (in Rs.100,000) 3,719.447 3,514.026
Total number of households who demanded work 71,612.710 56,786.270
Share of applicant HH who received job cards 0.988 0.031
Share of applicant HH who were allotted jobs 0.998 0.011
Share of HH who completed 100 days work 0.056 0.091
Length of new road constructed (in KM) 91.577 148.090
Cost sanctioned for construction of new road (in Rs.100,000) 2,195.388 4,132.280
Mean calibrated night light intensity 31.116 26.262
Control variables
Mean number of assembly constituencies in a district 7.089 4.860
Share of constituencies won by most successful party in a district 0.655 0.213
Share of constituencies won by second most successful party in a district 0.232 0.145
Difference in share of seats between most and second most successful party in a district 0.422 0.336
Sex ratio 0.484 0.016
Share of literate population 0.546 0.141
Share of population with completed primary schooling 0.143 0.040
Share of population with completed secondary schooling 0.074 0.035
Share of population with completed higher secondary schooling 0.042 0.027
Rural unemployment per 1000 people 43.76 36.80
Urban unemployment per 1000 people 62.13 33.21
Gross State Domestic Product 42476031.73 45483560.88
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for outcome variables based on distance to election
Outcome 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year 0 year
variable to election to election to election to election to election
Labor expenditure disbursed
by Government (in Rs.100,000)
Mean(SD) 3,264.46 (2,932.69) 3,265.55 (3,350.85) 3,002.20 (3,243.36) 4,032.65 (4,021.02) 4,318.32 (3,478.17)
Median 2,444.00 2,503.00 2,029.00 2,896.00 3,546.00
Min 1 1 1 1 1
Max 18799 23107 22860 30371 23519
Total number of HH
who demanded work
Mean(SD) 65,163.13 (50,038.31) 66,050.04 (49,807.19) 64,477.36 (53,210.32) 80,345.66 (65,003.13) 74,873.09 (57,610.18)
Median 57,622.50 53,757.00 50,698.00 61,982.00 62,653.00
Min 778 1608 1080 24 49
Max 305407 285414 297910 344832 323966
Share of applicant households
who received job cards
Mean(SD) 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.05) 0.99 (0.02)
Median 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99
Min 0.813 0.821 0.838 2.854 0.801
Max 1 1 1 1 1
Share of applicant households
who were allotted work
Mean(SD) 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.01) 1.00 (0.02) 1.00 (0.01)
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Min 0.987 0.950 0.943 0.647 0.926
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Share of applicant households
who received 100 days of work
Mean(SD) 0.05 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.07) 0.07 (0.12) 0.05 (0.10)
Median 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Min 0 0 0 0 0
Max 0.370 0.348 0.634 0.905 0.951
Length of new
road constructed
Mean(SD) 82.69 (131.10) 89.99 (144.44) 110.27 (149.95) 88.49 (176.40) 79.53 (122.34)
Median 30.10 34.57 51.62 27.45 35.80
Min 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.65
Max 916.62 1094.67 979.02 1652.36 867.5
Cost sanctioned for
road construction (in Rs.100,000)
Mean(SD) 2,010.06 (3,823.72) 2,017.61 (3,702.18) 2,495.73 (3,682.12) 2,518.70 (5,799.80) 1,752.04 (2,628.56)
Median 649.79 640.36 1,064.73 597.14 766.91
Min 4.56 13.09 0.22 12.61 8.85
Max 30689.22 24651.81 27287.76 47565.57 16344.2
Mean calibrated
total night light intensity
Mean(SD) 29.51 (25.59) 31.26 (26.47) 31.28 (26.55) 31.60 (26.31) 31.88 (26.33)
Median 20.38 22.41 22.72 23.39 23.56
Min 0.221 0 0 0 0
Max 105.0924 105.230 104.346 105.202 105.265
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Table 3.3: Summary table for high frequency median night light intensity across
months to election
Time to/after election Mean(SD) Median Min Max
Months to election=24 0.38 (2.61) -0.10 -7.52 26.43
Months to election=20 0.43 (2.37) 0.05 -7.11 27.91
Months to election=16 0.60 (2.47) 0.01 -8 26.04
Months to election=12 0.71 (2.83) 0.09 -6.42 22.11
Months to election=8 0.59 (2.27) 0.20 -7.50 41.60
Months to election=4 0.55 (2.33) 0.17 -8 27.54
Months to election=1 0.63 (2.25) 0.15 -7.71 29
Months to election=0 0.46 (2.23) 0.00 -5.19 22.2
Months after election=1 0.61 (2.68) 0.17 -7.16 21
Months after election=4 0.78 (2.55) 0.21 -5.5 21.43
Months after election=8 0.73 (3.85) 0.15 -15.95 44.85
Months after election=12 0.73 (2.95) 0.20 -6.23 17.61
Months after election=16 0.60 (2.21) 0.12 -5.33 18.65
Months after election=20 0.92 (3.37) 0.16 -4.25 62.79
Months after election=24 0.69 (2.61) 0.08 -8.84 26.8
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Table 3.4: Summary table for standardized high frequency median night light inten-
sity across months to election
Time to/after election Mean(SD) Median Min Max
Months to election = 24 -0.07 (0.53) -0.16 (-0.33, 0.12) -1.67 5.22
Months to election = 20 -0.06 (0.48) -0.13 (-0.30, 0.11) -1.58 5.52
Months to election = 16 -0.02 (0.50) -0.14 (-0.28, 0.10) -1.76 5.14
Months to election = 12 0.00 (0.57) -0.12 (-0.28, 0.13) -1.44 4.34
Months to election = 8 -0.02 (0.46) -0.10 (-0.26, 0.12) -1.66 8.30
Months to election = 4 -0.03 (0.47) -0.11 (-0.29, 0.09) -1.76 5.45
Months to election = 1 -0.02 (0.46) -0.11 (-0.27, 0.11) -1.71 5.74
Months to election = 0 -0.05 (0.45) -0.14 (-0.30, 0.11) -1.19 4.36
Months after election = 1 -0.02 (0.55) -0.11 (-0.31, 0.16) -1.59 4.12
Months after election = 4 0.01 (0.52) -0.10 (-0.25, 0.18) -1.26 4.21
Months after election = 8 0.00 (0.78) -0.11 (-0.29, 0.09) -3.38 8.97
Months after election = 12 0.00 (0.60) -0.10 (-0.28, 0.19) -1.41 3.43
Months after election = 16 -0.02 (0.45) -0.12 (-0.28, 0.12) -1.22 3.64
Months after election = 20 0.04 (0.68) -0.11 (-0.23, 0.11) -1.00 12.61
Months after election = 24 -0.00 (0.53) -0.13 (-0.27, 0.13) -1.94 5.30
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Table 3.5: The effect of proximity to election on labor expenditure made by the
government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Labor expenditure disbursed by Government in Rs.100,000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −83.277 −88.370 45.858 55.800 304.717
(125.712) (125.402) (133.077) (133.637) (193.064)
Time to election=2 years −454.965∗∗∗ −476.500∗∗∗ −323.048∗ −327.525∗ −335.705
(153.840) (164.324) (170.687) (170.231) (215.091)
Time to election=3 years −661.336∗∗∗ −721.769∗∗∗ −543.179∗∗∗ −561.660∗∗∗ −545.479∗∗
(150.415) (185.049) (192.538) (191.428) (231.780)
Time to election=4 years −779.795∗∗∗ −817.520∗∗∗ −714.188∗∗∗ −739.968∗∗∗ −770.431∗∗∗
(137.806) (143.298) (146.279) (145.828) (217.792)
Difference in seat share −381.139∗∗ −264.463
(163.548) (200.587)
Seat share × 1 year to election −482.439∗
(256.041)
Seat share × 2 years to election 31.690
(277.999)
Seat share × 3 years to election −2.800
(254.393)
Seat share × 4 years to election 84.377
(287.632)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.853 0.855 0.858 0.858 0.859
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.6: The effect of proximity to election on logarithm of households who de-
manded work under NREGA
Outcome variable:Logarithm of total number of HH who demanded work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −0.017 −0.021 −0.008 −0.009 −0.021
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037)
Time to election=2 years −0.061∗∗ −0.042 −0.022 −0.022 −0.038
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.041)
Time to election=3 years 0.014 0.065∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.027) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) (0.045)
Time to election=3 years −0.092∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.046∗ −0.043 −0.054
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.041)
Difference in seat share 0.042 0.032
(0.037) (0.050)
Seat share × 1 year to election 0.022
(0.064)
Seat share × 2 years to election 0.032
(0.060)
Seat share × 3 years to election −0.013
(0.065)
Seat share × 4 years to election 0.019
(0.064)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.921 0.923 0.927 0.927 0.927
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.7: The effect of proximity to election on the share of job cards issued by the
government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Share of job cards issued based on the number of applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Time to election=2 years 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time to election=3 years 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time to election=4 years 0.002 0.002 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Difference in seat share −0.002∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.006
(0.004)
Seat share × 2 years to election 0.002
(0.003)
Seat share × 3 years to election 0.003
(0.003)
Seat share × 4 years to election 0.002
(0.003)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.421 0.430 0.432 0.432 0.433
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.8: The effect of proximity to election on the share of households allotted jobs
by the government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Share of households allotted jobs based on the number of applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time to election=2 years −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time to election=3 years −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Time to election=4 years −0.001 0.0002 −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference in seat share −0.002 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.003
(0.003)
Seat share × 2 years to election −0.004∗∗∗
(0.002)
Seat share × 3 years to election −0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
Seat share × 4 years to election −0.004∗∗
(0.002)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.252 0.301 0.356 0.357 0.360
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.9: The effect of proximity to election on the share of households allotted 100
days of work by the government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Share of HH who were allotted 100 days of work out of all HH who were allotted work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 0.017∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Time to election=2 years 0.032∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Time to election=3 years 0.009 −0.001 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
Time to election=4 years −0.017∗ −0.021∗∗ −0.010 −0.010 −0.018
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012)
Difference in seat share −0.004 −0.003
(0.014) (0.016)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.004
(0.018)
Seat share × 2 years to election −0.012
(0.015)
Seat share × 3 years to election −0.002
(0.014)
Seat share × 4 years to election 0.015
(0.016)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.347 0.369 0.432 0.432 0.432
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.10: The effect of proximity to election on the length of the road constructed
by the government in the PMGSY programme
Outcome variable:Length of new road constructed in kilometers(KM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 23.917∗∗ 37.739∗∗∗ 33.321∗∗∗ 33.442∗∗∗ 11.786
(10.579) (12.051) (11.802) (11.770) (14.043)
Time to election=2 years 30.057∗∗∗ 43.213∗∗∗ 43.092∗∗∗ 43.447∗∗∗ 28.928∗∗
(7.676) (8.491) (8.724) (8.744) (13.014)
Time to election=3 years 11.244 21.013∗∗ 21.650∗∗ 21.759∗∗ 15.355
(8.994) (9.199) (9.115) (9.105) (14.677)
Time to election=4 years 7.764 25.909∗∗∗ 25.223∗∗ 25.166∗∗ 13.448
(8.664) (9.855) (9.940) (9.952) (13.168)
Difference in seat share −8.872 −37.692
(12.456) (27.209)
Seat share × 1 year to election 58.271
(37.920)
Seat share × 2 years to election 37.498
(30.761)
Seat share × 3 years to election 13.408
(32.926)
Seat share × 4 years to election 25.540
(32.681)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598
R2 0.137 0.026 0.063 0.063 0.067
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.11: The effect of proximity to election on the cost sanctioned for new road
to be constructed by the government in the PMGSY programme
Outcome variable:Cost sanctioned for new road construction in Rs.100,000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 1,184.360∗∗∗ 1,336.853∗∗∗ 1,208.585∗∗∗ 1,207.276∗∗∗ 712.508∗
(340.010) (358.552) (348.197) (347.583) (408.549)
Time to election=2 years 787.617∗∗∗ 1,167.873∗∗∗ 1,121.056∗∗∗ 1,117.252∗∗∗ 745.285∗∗
(198.313) (237.320) (249.040) (250.164) (337.837)
Time to election=3 years 368.514∗ 655.222∗∗∗ 633.378∗∗ 632.210∗∗ 564.906
(221.773) (240.190) (251.786) (251.806) (363.484)
Time to election=4 years 471.000∗∗ 939.715∗∗∗ 887.674∗∗∗ 888.279∗∗∗ 615.774∗
(234.003) (236.168) (242.206) (242.452) (332.411)
Difference in seat share 95.294 −539.985
(332.161) (702.026)
Seat share × 1 year to election 1,335.723
(1,066.920)
Seat share × 2 years to election 949.827
(755.155)
Seat share × 3 years to election 90.989
(781.559)
Seat share × 4 years to election 582.767
(817.704)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598 1,598
R2 0.115 0.027 0.068 0.068 0.072
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.12: The effect of proximity to election on the mean calibrated night light
intensity
Outcome variable:Mean calibrated night-light data (Excluding outliers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −0.703∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.150) (0.149) (0.149) (0.203)
Time to election=2 years −1.398∗∗∗ 0.103 −0.042 −0.022 0.043
(0.310) (0.175) (0.181) (0.183) (0.240)
Time to election=3 years −2.270∗∗∗ −0.029 −0.187 −0.157 −0.222
(0.368) (0.237) (0.250) (0.249) (0.319)
Time to election=4 years −4.290∗∗∗ −0.960∗∗∗ −1.204∗∗∗ −1.148∗∗∗ −0.537
(0.452) (0.268) (0.292) (0.298) (0.363)
Difference in seat share −1.414 −1.029
(0.862) (0.898)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.366
(0.325)
Seat share × 2 years to election −0.146
(0.443)
Seat share × 3 years to election 0.167
(0.509)
Seat share × 4 years to election −1.473∗∗
(0.656)
Seat share × 5 years to election −0.710
(1.957)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 7,699 7,699 7,699 7,699 7,699
R2 0.205 0.113 0.149 0.151 0.152
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.13: The effect of proximity to election on high frequency night light data
Outcome variable:Monthly median night light intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
12 months to election 0.062 0.060 0.154 0.154 0.013
(0.047) (0.047) (0.110) (0.110) (0.178)
11 months to election −0.079 −0.074 −0.266∗∗ −0.266∗∗ −0.343
(0.055) (0.055) (0.126) (0.126) (0.231)
10 months to election 0.044 0.048 0.297∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.104) (0.104) (0.187)
9 months to election 0.122∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.091) (0.091) (0.142)
8 months to election 0.062 0.059 −0.050 −0.050 0.225
(0.043) (0.043) (0.130) (0.130) (0.313)
7 months to election −0.011 −0.013 −0.020 −0.020 −0.096
(0.043) (0.044) (0.082) (0.082) (0.155)
6 months to election 0.174∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.048 0.048 0.321
(0.057) (0.057) (0.100) (0.100) (0.199)
5 months to election −0.145∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.171∗∗ −0.031
(0.041) (0.040) (0.068) (0.068) (0.120)
4 months to election −0.136∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.087 −0.087 0.093
(0.042) (0.042) (0.085) (0.085) (0.144)
3 months to election −0.199∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.192∗∗ −0.228
(0.046) (0.046) (0.097) (0.097) (0.149)
2 months to election −0.151∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.015 −0.279∗
(0.040) (0.039) (0.084) (0.084) (0.153)
1 month to election 0.143∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.267∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.075) (0.075) (0.144)
0 months to election −0.097∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗ 0.090 0.090 0.052
(0.041) (0.041) (0.087) (0.087) (0.168)
1 month after election 0.070 0.067 −0.175 −0.175 −0.134
(0.052) (0.052) (0.112) (0.112) (0.206)
2 months after election −0.013 −0.012 −0.110 −0.110 0.052
(0.048) (0.048) (0.105) (0.105) (0.190)
3 months after election 0.112 0.087 0.013 0.013 0.131
(0.070) (0.070) (0.121) (0.121) (0.211)
4 months after election 0.252∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.115) (0.115) (0.197)
5 months after election 0.040 0.020 −0.491∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ −0.525∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.113) (0.113) (0.212)
6 months after election −0.125∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ −0.076 −0.076 −0.379∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.050) (0.077) (0.077) (0.140)
7 months after election −0.276∗∗∗ −0.275∗∗∗ −0.189∗∗ −0.189∗∗ −0.0003
(0.046) (0.046) (0.079) (0.079) (0.155)
8 months after election −0.021 −0.025 −0.004 −0.004 0.008
(0.084) (0.085) (0.081) (0.081) (0.134)
9 months after election 0.062 0.076∗ −0.055 −0.055 −0.237∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.070) (0.070) (0.117)
10 months after election −0.150∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.112 −0.112 −0.405∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.080) (0.080) (0.125)
11 months after election −0.042 −0.046 0.047 0.047 0.028
(0.032) (0.033) (0.065) (0.065) (0.108)
12 months after election 0.021 0.0003 0.022 0.022 0.048
(0.050) (0.049) (0.105) (0.105) (0.169)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.14: The effect of proximity to election on standardized high frequency night
light data
Outcome variable:Monthly standardized median night light intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
time to election)1 0.013 0.012 0.032 0.031 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (0.036)
time to election)2 −0.016 −0.015 −0.053∗∗ −0.054∗∗ −0.070
(0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.026) (0.047)
time to election)3 0.009 0.010 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) (0.038)
time to election)4 0.025∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.019) (0.018) (0.029)
time to election)5 0.013 0.013 −0.008 −0.010 0.046
(0.009) (0.009) (0.026) (0.026) (0.064)
time to election)6 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.004 −0.019
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031)
time to election)7 0.035∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.010 0.010 0.065
(0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.040)
time to election)8 −0.029∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024)
time to election)9 −0.028∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.018 0.019
(0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029)
time to election)10 −0.040∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.039∗∗ −0.046
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030)
time to election)11 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.003 −0.057∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.031)
time to election)12 0.029∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.054∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.029)
time to election)13 −0.020∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ 0.019 0.018 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.018) (0.034)
time to election)14 0.014 0.013 −0.036 −0.036 −0.027
(0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042)
time to election)15 −0.003 −0.002 −0.023 −0.022 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.039)
time to election)16 0.023 0.018 0.002 0.003 0.027
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025) (0.043)
time to election)17 0.051∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023) (0.040)
time to election)18 0.008 0.004 −0.099∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) (0.043)
time to election)19 −0.025∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.015 −0.077∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.029)
time to election)20 −0.056∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.0001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.032)
time to election)21 −0.004 −0.006 −0.002 −0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.027)
time to election)22 0.013 0.015∗ −0.014 −0.011 −0.048∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024)
time to election)23 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.025 −0.023 −0.082∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025)
time to election)24 −0.008 −0.010 0.008 0.010 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022)
time to election)25 0.004 −0.001 0.004 0.004 0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.034)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table 3.15: The effect of proximity to election on the high frequency median night
light intensity aggregated at a yearly level
Outcome variable:Monthly night light data aggregated to yearly data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
log(Total population) 0.193 0.166 0.161 0.162
(0.154) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156)
Sex ratio 11.628∗∗ 19.216∗∗∗ 19.077∗∗∗ 19.049∗∗∗
(5.852) (5.813) (5.836) (5.829)
Share of literate population 1.089 0.807 0.768 0.765
(0.849) (0.839) (0.833) (0.836)
Share of population with completed primary −7.381∗∗∗ −7.699∗∗∗ −7.713∗∗∗ −7.704∗∗∗
(0.533) (0.554) (0.555) (0.556)
Share of population with completed secondary 5.373∗∗∗ 4.926∗∗∗ 4.898∗∗∗ 4.894∗∗∗
(0.865) (0.931) (0.930) (0.930)
Share of population with completed HS 10.959∗∗∗ 11.427∗∗∗ 11.464∗∗∗ 11.474∗∗∗
(0.954) (0.991) (0.992) (0.991)
Unemployment rate:Rural −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment rate:Urban 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Difference in seat share 0.050 0.082
(0.034) (0.056)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X
Observations 9,713 9,713 9,713 9,713
R2 0.842 0.851 0.851 0.852
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01







Figure A.1: Similarity in hashtags for positive tweets over time
Before After




















Notes: Similarity in hashtags were computed for only positive tweets, which were found by running
the Sentiment Vader package on the tweets
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Figure A.2: Similarity in hashtags for negative tweets over time
Before After




















Notes: Similarity in hashtags were computed for only negative tweets, which were found by
running the Sentiment Vader package on the tweets
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Figure A.3: Trend of inverse of euclidean distance of hashtags interacted with senti-
ments
Before After































Notes: Similarity in hashtags were computed for only negative tweets, which were found by
running the Sentiment Vader package on the tweets
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Figure A.4: Euclidean Distance for intensity of positive, negative and neutral senti-
ments in a topic between Democrats and Republicans
Before After
































Notes: Euclidean distance between the vector of intensity of positive, negative and neutral





Figure B.1: Similarity in hashtags over time for English and Hindi tweets
Before Election After





















Notes: The figure plots the number of common hashtags used in the top 10, 20, 40, 50 and100
hashtags used by BJP and INC politicians in English tweets. The Before facet shows the pattern
before the election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election whereas the After
facet shows the pattern after election.
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Figure B.2: Euclidean Distance for intensity of positive, negative and neutral senti-
ments in a topic between Democrats and Republicans
Before Election After












Notes: Sum Dis measures the euclidean distance between the vector of intensity of positive,
negative and neutral sentiments in a topic between BJP and INC politicians. Sum Disstd shows
the standardized version as explained in the text. The Before facet shows what the pattern before
the election, the Election period shows the pattern during the election whereas the After facet





Table C.1: The effect of proximity to election on change in labor expenditure made
by the government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Change in labor expenditure disbursed by Government (in Rs.100,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 122.947 125.095 173.775 168.011 565.555∗∗∗
(127.556) (126.170) (138.068) (138.412) (198.518)
Time to election=2 years 159.313 114.619 183.082 185.678 310.289
(195.532) (191.599) (196.177) (196.137) (263.670)
Time to election=3 years 239.391 156.997 247.294 258.010 432.989
(214.208) (211.288) (212.900) (212.922) (294.259)
Time to election=4 years −436.514∗∗ −471.238∗∗∗ −436.940∗∗ −421.992∗∗ 56.143
(180.766) (169.320) (169.807) (170.603) (246.072)
Difference in seat share 220.996 570.701∗∗∗
(140.424) (215.126)
Seat share × 1 year to election −768.243∗∗
(299.122)
Seat share × 2 years to election −230.054
(352.208)
Seat share × 3 years to election −303.570
(393.003)
Seat share × 4 years to election −920.798∗∗∗
(355.273)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.221 0.223 0.226 0.226 0.231
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.2: The effect of proximity to election on the logarithm of change in the total
number of households who demanded jobs under the NREGA programm
Outcome variable:Logarithm of change in the number of households demanding work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 0.062 0.057 0.027 0.018 0.045
(0.112) (0.110) (0.118) (0.117) (0.179)
Time to election=2 years −0.199 −0.128 −0.098 −0.087 −0.062
(0.170) (0.167) (0.175) (0.175) (0.239)
Time to election=3 years 0.419∗∗ 0.425∗∗ 0.466∗∗ 0.497∗∗ 0.572∗∗
(0.199) (0.206) (0.215) (0.216) (0.267)
Time to election=4 years 0.155 0.150 0.231 0.262 0.035
(0.190) (0.190) (0.192) (0.190) (0.279)
Difference in seat share 0.312∗∗ 0.293
(0.129) (0.188)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.018
(0.263)
Seat share × 2 years to election 0.028
(0.314)
Seat share × 3 years to election −0.075
(0.330)
Seat share × 4 years to election 0.592
(0.440)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013
R2 0.936 0.938 0.940 0.940 0.940
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.3: The effect of proximity to election on the change in share of job cards
issued by the government in the NREGA programm
Outcome variable:Change in the share of job cards issued based on the number of applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −0.838 −0.828 −1.058 −1.063 −0.539
(0.522) (0.513) (0.662) (0.667) (0.572)
Time to election=2 years −0.762 −0.755 −0.963 −0.961 −0.382
(0.573) (0.619) (0.754) (0.752) (0.745)
Time to election=3 years −1.313 −1.333 −1.544 −1.533 −2.181
(0.871) (1.062) (1.187) (1.180) (2.135)
Time to election=4 years 0.190 0.186 0.098 0.113 0.715
(0.423) (0.360) (0.361) (0.361) (0.616)
Difference in seat share 0.222 0.566
(0.258) (0.586)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.989
(0.817)
Seat share × 2 years to election −1.142
(1.017)
Seat share × 3 years to election 1.375
(2.147)
Seat share × 4 years to election −1.115
(0.916)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.163 0.163 0.164 0.164 0.166
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.4: The effect of proximity to election on the change in share of households
allotted jobs by the government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Change in share of households allotted jobs based on the number of applicants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −0.022 −0.022 −0.026 −0.028 0.076∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.040)
Time to election=2 years −0.041 −0.062 −0.012 −0.011 0.057
(0.046) (0.075) (0.049) (0.049) (0.054)
Time to election=3 years −0.018 −0.060 0.030 0.033 0.141∗∗
(0.063) (0.116) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067)
Time to election=4 years −0.053 −0.073 −0.005 −0.001 0.084∗∗
(0.074) (0.097) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043)
Difference in seat share 0.059 0.165∗
(0.049) (0.088)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.205∗
(0.106)
Seat share × 2 years to election −0.136∗
(0.077)
Seat share × 3 years to election −0.212∗∗∗
(0.080)
Seat share × 4 years to election −0.161∗∗
(0.081)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.158 0.161 0.223 0.223 0.228
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.5: The effect of proximity to election on the change in share of households
allotted 100 days of work by the government in the NREGA programme
Outcome variable:Change in share of HH who were allotted 100 days of work out of all HH who were allotted work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 13.959 11.361 18.084 18.109 68.820
(14.483) (12.629) (14.130) (14.090) (48.874)
Time to election=2 years 25.416 14.209 25.955 25.944 46.195
(23.859) (14.595) (16.803) (16.813) (32.875)
Time to election=3 years 35.207 25.007 31.821 31.776 51.796
(33.063) (22.978) (20.550) (20.575) (37.171)
Time to election=4 years 45.272 39.742 29.365 29.301 46.948
(41.309) (35.490) (20.044) (20.098) (35.353)
Difference in seta share −0.935 35.921
(5.830) (30.240)
Seat share × 1 year to election −98.933
(68.804)
Seat share × 2 years to election −39.041
(33.063)
Seat share × 3 years to election −36.062
(33.084)
Seat share × 4 years to election −30.728
(29.610)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642 1,642
R2 0.149 0.158 0.494 0.494 0.498
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.6: The effect of proximity to election on the change in the length of the road
constructed by the government in the PMGSY programme
Outcome variable:Change in length of new road constructed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 33.013∗∗∗ 24.821∗ 18.388 18.378 −10.700
(12.116) (13.858) (13.530) (13.518) (19.260)
Time to election=2 years 33.786∗∗∗ 30.863∗∗ 24.571∗ 24.512∗ −6.671
(10.560) (12.005) (12.799) (12.761) (18.637)
Time to election=3 years 25.860∗∗∗ 16.681 12.345 12.337 −6.446
(9.797) (11.375) (11.682) (11.675) (17.718)
Time to election=4 years 26.926∗∗ 21.248 18.362 18.400 −21.904
(10.896) (14.735) (15.028) (15.120) (20.522)
Difference in seat share 2.087 −58.599∗
(13.146) (30.973)
Seat share × 1 year to election 77.183∗
(40.685)
Seat share × 2 years to election 80.688∗∗
(37.739)
Seat share × 3 years to election 45.556
(33.914)
Seat share × 4 years to election 98.924∗∗
(41.027)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563
R2 0.019 0.024 0.048 0.048 0.056
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.7: The effect of proximity to election on the change in the cost sanctioned
for new road to be constructed by the government in the PMGSY programme
Outcome variable:Change in cost sanctioned for new road construction (in Rs.100,000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 868.005∗∗∗ 752.955∗ 490.011 488.985 46.661
(321.894) (385.824) (362.837) (362.491) (483.416)
Time to election=2 years 653.215∗∗∗ 407.704 160.249 154.087 −593.493
(242.968) (279.778) (305.820) (306.888) (418.984)
Time to election=3 years 407.593 52.084 −103.784 −104.696 −397.899
(249.287) (277.257) (283.135) (283.636) (409.037)
Time to election=4 years 514.682∗∗ 362.565 285.044 289.028 −690.967
(258.755) (310.050) (318.915) (320.670) (476.513)
Difference in seat share 219.891 −995.378
(308.368) (730.434)
Seat share × 1 year to election 1,154.186
(1,038.350)
Seat share × 2 years to election 1,919.010∗∗
(876.301)
Seat share × 3 years to election 709.488
(849.953)
Seat share × 4 years to election 2,443.643∗∗
(1,072.159)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563 1,563
R2 0.022 0.037 0.074 0.074 0.081
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.8: The effect of proximity to election on the mean calibrated night light
intensity
Outcome variable:Change in mean calibrated night-light data (Excluding outliers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year 0.348∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.678∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.230)
Time to election=2 years −0.451∗∗∗ −0.045 −0.070 −0.064 0.138
(0.170) (0.162) (0.165) (0.166) (0.269)
Time to election=3 years 0.467∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.666∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.117
(0.193) (0.181) (0.180) (0.179) (0.273)
Time to election=4 years −0.331∗ 0.088 0.051 0.067 0.629∗∗
(0.177) (0.168) (0.176) (0.177) (0.266)
Difference in seat share −0.410∗∗ −0.201
(0.187) (0.275)
Seat share × 1 year to election −0.528
(0.408)
Seat share × 2 years to election −0.479
(0.458)
Seat share × 3 years to election 1.405∗∗∗
(0.515)
Seat share × 4 years to election −1.332∗∗∗
(0.432)
Seat share × 5 years to election 1.385∗
(0.736)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 7,699 7,699 7,699 7,699 7,699
R2 0.016 0.015 0.021 0.021 0.025
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.9: The effect of proximity to election on the mean calibrated night light
intensity including outliers
Outcome variable:Mean calibrated night-light data (Including outliers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −10.551 −2.902 −2.772 −2.618 2.144
(8.016) (2.606) (2.469) (2.364) (1.864)
Time to election=2 years −10.215 2.493 2.816 3.042 −3.217
(6.997) (1.921) (2.234) (2.371) (3.197)
Time to election=3 years −10.010∗ −1.189 −0.653 −0.322 −2.476
(5.648) (0.894) (0.890) (0.702) (2.071)
Time to election=4 years −26.976∗ −4.743∗∗ −4.009∗∗ −3.371∗∗ −4.251
(14.332) (2.354) (1.817) (1.396) (2.595)
Difference in seat share −17.382 −19.629
(19.110) (19.423)
Seat share × 1 year to election −11.861
(9.320)
Seat share × 2 years to election 15.838
(12.723)
Seat share × 3 years to election 5.662
(5.701)
Seat share × 4 years to election 2.123
(4.155)
Seat share × 5 years to election 5.888
(6.204)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 8,700 8,700 8,700 8,700 8,700
R2 0.033 0.007 0.010 0.011 0.012
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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Table C.10: The effect of proximity to election on the change in mean calibrated
night light intensity including outliers
Outcome variable:Change in mean calibrated night-light data (Including outliers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression Panel regression
with FE with FE with party FE with FE & competition with FE & interactions
Time to election=1 year −9.106 −9.117 −9.075 −9.038 6.799
(7.019) (7.257) (7.238) (7.212) (6.613)
Time to election=2 years −3.401 −2.405 −2.302 −2.247 3.362
(2.129) (1.824) (1.761) (1.728) (2.704)
Time to election=3 years −0.770 0.314 0.493 0.574 2.954
(1.199) (0.789) (0.697) (0.689) (2.277)
Time to election=4 years −5.467 −5.186 −4.914 −4.759 1.992
(3.375) (3.446) (3.292) (3.184) (3.575)
Difference in seat share −4.225 11.391
(4.587) (8.509)
Seat share × 1 year to election −39.723
(31.220)
Seat share × 2 years to election −14.255
(10.371)
Seat share × 3 years to election −5.952
(6.175)
Seat share × 4 years to election −16.753
(13.980)
Seat share × 5 years to election −13.810
(11.657)
Party fixed effects X X X
Demographic & economic controls X X X X X
District fixed effects X X X X X
Year fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 8,700 8,700 8,700 8,700 8,700
R2 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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